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ADDENDUM
ERRATA
Page 15, note 60, 6th line from end. For "five-sixths" read "five-elevenths."
Page 115, note 1. For "1-202(2) (a)" read "1-102(2) (a)."
Page 120, line 18. For "we" read "he."
Page 131, line 7. Delete "five-to-four."
Page 132, lines 4-6. For sentence '%r. Justice . . . holding." read '"Mr. Justice Douglas'
concurring opinion disagreed with the basic reasoning of the Court in several critical
respects including the resultant narrowness of the holding."
Page 284, note 1, line 2. For "2000-2" read "2000a-2."
Page 317, 11 lines from bottom of text. Delete "in."
Page 369, note 69, line 8. Delete line and substitute "v. Landsman, supra, such as Lodati v.
Lodati, 261 App. Div." 2d to last line. For "rev'd" read "rev'g."
Page 405, * line 2. For "Profesor" read "Professor."
Page 421, line 19. For "C." read "2." Line should be in Roman type.
Page 477, note 5, lines 5, 10 and 15. For "Security" read "Securities."
Page 477, note 6, line 2. For "with" read period. Delete remainder of note to word
"Diamond."

THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE-WHY IT OUGHT
TO BE ABOLISHED
JOHN D. FEERICK*

F the popular-vote winner were to lose a presidential election, or if the
House of Representatives were required to select the President or the
Senate the Vice President, resentment, unrest, public clamor for reform
and an atmosphere of crisis would probably ensue. Yet these and other
situations can, and do, arise under the electoral college system. Inherent
in this system is the possibility that the will of the people will be frustrated. In the forty-five presidential elections under the electoral college
system, three popular-vote losers were elected President, two Presidents
were selected by the House of Representatives, one Vice President was
chosen by the Senate, and one President was elected as a result of a
straight party vote by members of an electoral commission appointed by
Congress. In fifteen other elections a shift of less than one percent of the
national vote cast would have made the popular-vote loser President. In
five elections a minor shift of the popular vote would have thrown the
election into Congress. Within the last twenty years, two elections narrowly missed being decided by Congress; Democratic and Republican
electors defected and voted against their party nominees in the electoral
college; and voters in one state were afforded no opportunity in two elections to vote for the national candidates of one of the major parties.
To many observers in the United States and abroad, the election of the
President and Vice President has appeared to be a relatively simple
matter: Every four years, on the Tuesday after the first Monday in
November, many millions of people go to the polls and express their choice
for President and Vice President. Later that day or early the next they
expect to learn via the communications media whom they have elected.
They assume that the popular-vote winners will take office on January 20
as President and Vice President.
Actually, the election of the President and Vice President is not so
simple. It involves a system which has been characterized by a prestigious
commission of the American Bar Association as "archaic, undemocratic,
complex, ambiguous, indirect, and dangerous."' This article discusses
* Member, New York Bar. The author served as advisor to the American Bar Association Commission on Electoral College Reform and currently is a member of the Special
Committee on Electoral College Reform of the American Bar Association.
1. American Bar Association, Report of the Commission on Electoral College Reform,
Electing The President, at 3-4 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as "Electing The President!,.
See notes 132-33 infra.
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that system-how it operates; how it was intended to operate; its defects and dangers; and the proposals for changing the system.2
I.

THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE SYSTEM

When the people go to the polls in November of every presidential
election year, they do not vote for the candidates themselves but rather
for electors in whose hands they place the choice of President and Vice
President. The Constitution provides that each state has as many electors
as it has Senators and Representatives in Congress.' At present, 538 electoral votes are allocated among the fifty states and the District of Columbia.4
Since presidential elections are decided on the basis of electoral votes,
each of the major parties nominates, in presidential election years, a slate
of electors in every state and the District of Columbia. The size of the
slate corresponds to the number of electoral votes to which the state is
entitled. The members of these slates are usually selected because of their
service and devotion to the party. The method of nomination of electors
is governed by the provisions of state law and varies from state to state.5
State party conventions, state party committees, and state primaries are
the usual methods.
The appearance on the ballot of the names of each party's electors and
candidates is also governed by state law. 6 Two-thirds of the states use the
presidential short ballot, which prints the names of the presidential and
vice presidential candidates on the ballot in lieu of the names of the electors. In fourteen states the names of the candidates and the electors
appear on the ballot. In one state only the names of the electors appear.
Thus, in the November election the people in each state normally
choose as a unit the electoral slate of one of the parties.' The voting is
2. The definitive work in the field is N. Peirce, The People's President (1968). Other good
treatises are J. Dougherty, The Electoral System of the United States (1906); C. O'Nell,
The American Electoral System (1887); L. Wilmerding, Jr., The Electoral College (1958).
3. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1; U.S. Const. amend. XII.
4. The District of Columbia was given a voice in presidential elections by the twentythird amendment, which guarantees to it a number of electors "equal to the whole number
of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it
were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State . . . ." The number of
electoral votes to which each state is presently entitled, together with the present ratio of
electoral votes to population, is set forth in App. A.
5. The pertinent laws of the fifty states and the District of Columbia are summarized
in R. Hupman & R. Tienken, Nomination and Election of the President and Vice President
of the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office Pub. No. 3671 (Jan. 1968).
6. See id. See also N. Peirce, supra note 2, at 338-39.
7. In some states voters ballot separately for electors, and it is possible to vote for
electors on different slates, or write in the name of a person for an elector. Thus in the
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on a statewide basis and the electoral slate which receives a plurality of
popular votes is elected, except in Georgia where a majority vote is
required.8 While electors are today chosen by the people in every state,
this is due solely to state law and not to any popular election requirement
contained in the Constitution. The Constitution simply requires the states
to appoint electors in such manner as their legislatures may direct.'
The electors who are chosen in each state are required by federal law
to meet in their respective states on the Monday after the second Wednesday in December (or forty-one days after the November election) to cast
their votes for President and Vice President. 0 On that day, fifty-one
separate electoral college proceedings take place. The electors participating in each, who are generally unknown to the public, are expected to
vote for the nominees of their party. Although it is generally recognized
that electors are under no legal obligation to vote for the candidates of
their party, most electors regard themselves as being under a moral and
political, if not legal, obligation to do so."
The electoral college proceedings of the several states and the District
election of 1896 a split ticket of electors was chosen in California and Kentucky; in 19G04
and 1908, in Maryland; in 1912, in California; and in 1916, in West Virginia. Where a presidential candidate is endorsed by more than one party, it is important that the slates of
electors of each party be the same; otherwise, the votes received on each party's line can not
be pooled. See N.Y. Times, August 29, 1968, at 28, col. 1; N.Y. Times, August 30, 196S at
8, cols. 2-6; N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1968, at 1, cols. 2-3, concerning a dispute as to the
Republican electors running on the Conservative Party line. In 1960 Kennedy received more than 400,000 votes in New York on the Liberal Party line. Since there was
a joint slate of Democratic-Liberal electors, he received all of New York's electoral votes.
If there had been separate slates, the votes received on both lines could not have been
pooled, and Kennedy would have lost New York's electoral votes and the election.
8. Where no electoral slate receives a majority in Georgia, the two top slates participate
in a runoff election two weeks after the general election. Ga. Code Ann. § 34-1514 (Supp.
1967).
9. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; U.S. Const. amend. XII. See note 47, infra, and accompanying
text.
10. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (1964).
11. Only in a few states do candidates for elector pledge themselves, or take an oath, to
vote for their party nominees (e.g., Alaska, Florida, Oklahoma and Oregon). In the
vast majority of the states, the pledge is merely an implied one, as where the names of
the candidates and not the electors appear on the ballot and a vote for one of the candidates is deemed a vote for the party's slate of electors; or where the candidates and electors
of each party are listed on the ballot as a group. In about one-third of the states there are
statutory provisions requiring electors to vote for the national candidates of their party;
and in a few states, it is a crime for an elector to violate his pledge (eg., Oklahoma).
The constitutionality of these laws, however, is in doubt. See note 79, infra, and accompanying text. See generally Nomination and Election of the President and Vice President
of the United States, supra note 5; Proposals To Change the Method of Electing the
President, 46 Cong. Dig. 263, 288 (1967).
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of Columbia are of a non-deliberative and formal nature. Invocations are
offered, the roll is called, vacancies in the electoral college membership
are filled, welcoming speeches are made, temporary and permanent officers are selected, resolutions dealing with travel and per diem expenses
are passed, motions for adjournment for lunch are passed, further
speeches are heard and finally, near the end of the day, the electors
vote for President and Vice President. 2 They vote separately for each
office. Although the Constitution requires the votes to be by ballot (i.e.,
by secret vote), the electors in many of these proceedings announce orally
or by signature the candidates for whom they vote. 18 Once the votes are
cast, the electors in each state make and sign certificates listing the votes
cast for President and Vice President. The certificates, to which lists of
the names of the electors are annexed, are sent to the President of the
Senate, the secretary of state of the state, the Administrator of General
Services, and the judge of the district in which the electors assembled.1 4
By federal law, the certificates of the electors are not opened until
January 6.1 That day, before a joint session of Congress meeting in the
Hall of the House of Representatives beginning at 1:00 P.M., the electoral certificates are opened by the President of the Senate, who is the
Vice President of the United States. The certificates are opened in the
alphabetical order of the states and are given to tellers-two from
each House. The tellers announce the results of each state's voting and
compile the national totals." The President of the Senate then announces
the total number of electoral votes received by each of the candidates.
The candidates with a majority are declared President elect and Vice
President elect.
12. The proceedings of a typical electoral college are described in Dixon, Jr., Electoral
College Procedure, 3 West. Pol. Q. 214, 219-20 (1950). See Proceedings of the Electoral
College of the State of New York (1964).
13. See L. Wilmerding, supra note 2, at 43.
14.
15.

3 U.S.C. § 11 (1964).
3 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).

16. Electoral vote disputes are handled in the following manner: Where one set of elector
returns is received from a state, and the governor has certified under the state's seal the
appointment of those electors, the returns must be accepted unless the two Houses of Congress concurrently reject them. If more than one set is received from a state, Congress must

accept the returns of those electors whose appointments have been "finally" determined in
accordance with state law, provided the determination was made at least six days before the
meeting of electors in December. If there has been no final determination by the prescribed
time, then the approval of both Houses of Congress is necessary before any votes can be
counted, except that if the Houses disagree, the votes of the electors whose appointments
have been certified by the state governor must be counted. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). In the
election of 1960 three sets of electoral certificates were received from Hawaii. One certified
the election of Republican electors; another, Democratic electors; and the third, signed by
the governor of the state, Democratic electors. When the electors met on December 19,
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If no candidates have a majority of the votes for these offices, the Constitution requires the House of Representatives to select the President
from "the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the
list of those voted for as President," and the Senate to select the Vice
President from the "two highest numbers."'17 In the House, each state has
one vote, a quorum consists of representation from two-thirds of the
states, and a majority (i.e., twenty-six) of the votes of all the states is
necessary for election. Under the rules of the House, the vote of a state
is awarded to the candidate who receives a majority of the votes cast by
the state's congressional delegation on any one balloting. 8 If a state
delegation is evenly divided, as several are at present, that state casts no
vote. The rules of the House also provide for continuous balloting for
President. The balloting is by the newly-elected House of Representatives
and begins on January 6 and continues until a President is chosen.
In the Senate, each Senator has one vote, a quorum consists of twothirds of the whole number of Senators, and the votes of a majority of the
whole number are necessary for election as Vice President. In the event
the House failed to make a choice by Inauguration Day (January 20),
the Vice President, if one had been selected by the Senate, would act as

President until the House reached a decision and the President was
qualified."' If the Senate had also failed to make a choice, the powers and
duties of President would devolve on the Speaker of the House of Representatives in accordance with the Succession Law of 1947. He would continue as acting President until a President or Vice President qualified.20
Nixon was the apparent winner, although a court-ordered recount was in progress. Both
Democratic and Republican electors met that day in Hawaii and voted for the candidates
of their respective parties. On December 30, a lower court ruled in favor of the Democrats
but, since the period in which to appeal had not expired, this judgment was not final when
the electoral votes were counted on January 6, 1961. Nixon, who as Vice President presided
at the joint session, suggested that the Democratic returns be accepted, and this was followed without objection. 107 Cong. Rec. 288-90 (1961).
17. The twelfth amendment is not clear as to whether the "three" refers to "persons" or
"numbers;" or as to whether the House of Representatives could limit its choice to the top
two candidates regardless of the antecedent of "three." If the reference be to "numbers," it
is possible for more than three candidates to have the highest three numbers of electoral
votes. Query: Would the House have to consider all such candidates? The debates preceding
the adoption of the amendment are inconclusive. See 14 Annals of Cong. 92, 97-105, 109-

24, 678-82 (1803-04).
18. These are the rules as adopted for the House election in 1825. 1 Cong. Deb. 361,
490-51

(1824-25). See N. Peirce, supra note 2, at 335-37.

19. See Baker, The Picking of the President, 1968, The Saturday Evening Post, March
9, 1968, at 19.
20. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1964), as amended, 79 Stat. 669 (1965) and 80 Star. 948 (1966), which
also sets forth a line of succession beyond the Speaker. It should be pointed out that the
Speaker is appointed after each new Congress convenes in January.
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THE DESIGN OF THE FRAMERS

The Framers of the Constitution had considerable difficulty in deciding
on a method for electing the President. As James Wilson of Pennsylvania
remarked during the debates at the Constitutional Convention: "This
subject has greatly divided the House, and will also divide people out of
doors. It is in truth the most difficult of all on which we have had to
decide.""
More than fifteen proposals for electing the President were presented to
the Convention.22 An election by Congress was the method most frequently approved throughout the Convention.' Roger Sherman, as well
as others, argued that the Executive "ought to be appointed by and accountable to the Legislature only, which was the despositary of the supreme will of the Society. 2 4 In the end, however, this method was rejected because of the fear that it would involve intrigue, "cabal" and
"corruption," would lead to interference in the election process by foreign
2
governments, and would render the President subservient to Congress. 1
Said Gouverneur Morris: "If the Legislature elect, it will be the work of
intrigue, of cabal, and of faction: it will be like the election of a pope by
a conclave of cardinals; real merit will rarely be the title to the appointment. ' 26 A number of delegates expressed the view that a legislative
election would require the President to be ineligible for another term.
Otherwise, he would be totally dependent on Congress, since he would
have to court its members for re-election. Generally, the delegates were
opposed to an ineligibility requirement, believing it would remove some
of the incentive for excellence and would deprive the country of further
service from Presidents who had demonstrated a capacity to govern.
An election directly by the people was supported by a number of leading delegates, including James Wilson, James Madison, Gouverneur
21. 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 501 (M. Farrand ed. 1911 & 1937)
[hereinafter cited as Farrand].
22. The author traces the development of the electoral college provision in his article,
Feerick, The Electoral College: Why It Was Created, 54 A.BA.J. 249 (1968).
23. It was approved on June 2, July 17, July 24 and July 26, 1787, and on August 24
the delegates decided that the election should be by joint ballot of both Houses. 1 Farrand
81; 2 Farrand 32, 101, 121, 403.
24. 1 Farrand 65.
25. See 1 Farrand 175; 2 Farrand 29, 34, 500. The concern of the Framers about interference from foreign governments seems to have been based on the method of selecting kings
in Poland. The king was selected for life by noblemen who, experience indicated, were interfered with in the process by representatives of other countries. 2 Farrand 109-10. The Pollsh

experience was also used as an argument against letting the people elect the President. Id.
at 30.
26.

Id. at 29.
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Morris, Daniel Carroll, and John Dickinson.' The principal arguments
advanced in support of the method were that it had worked well in the
election of state governors, that it would make the President independent
of Congress and the states, that it would nearly always result in the selection of persons of distinguished character and national reputation, 2 s and
that the people constituted the "purest" 9 and "fittest"'' source of election. If the President "is to be the Guardian of the people," declared
Gouverneur Morris, "let him be appointed by the people ... ."'' Madison
stated that although he was from the South where suffrage was limited,
he was willing to support direct election because "local considerations
must give way to the general interest." - Other delegates, however,
strongly felt that the method was impractical for the times. George
Mason stated:
[1]t would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for chief Magistrate to the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours to a blind man. The extent
of the Country renders it impossible that the people can have the requisite capacity
33
to judge of the respective pretensions of the Candidates.

Elbridge Gerry said the "ignorance of the people" would make it possible
for an organized group to "elect the chief Magistrate in every instance,
if the election be referred to the people."34 The method was also criticized on the grounds that the partiality of the people for persons from
their own states would favor the large states; the Southern States would
be placed at a disadvantage because of their limited suffrage; and a majority of the people would be unable to agree on one person. Largely due
to these arguments, direct election was rejected on the two occasions it
was put to a vote 5
An intermediate elector plan was proposed early in the Convention by
James Wilson, who suggested that the election be by the electors chosen
by the people in districts within each state3 This proposal, under which
all the electors would meet at the same place, was promptly rejected. One
27.
28.

See 1 Farrand 68-69; 2 Farrand 29, 56-57, 109-11, 114, 402.
2 Farrand 56, 114-15. At the time of the Convention governors were elected by the

people in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Rhode Island. In the
other eight states they were elected by the legislatures.
29.

Id. at 114.

30. Id. at 56.
31. Id. at 53.
32. Id. at 111.
33. Id. at 31.
34. Id. at 114.
35. It was rejected on July 17, by 9 to 1, with Pennsylvania voting in favor, and on
August 24, by 9 to 2, with Delaware and Pennsylvania voting in favor. Id. at 32, 402.
36. 1 Farrand at 80.
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month later Luther Martin suggested an election by electors appointed
by the state legislatures.17 Although it was defeated on the day it was
proposed, it was approved by the Convention two days later. 8 Shortly
thereafter, the Convention rejected the proposal and reinstated election
by Congress. 9 In the following month Gouverneur Morris' proposal that
the election be by electors chosen by the people failed by an equal vote.40
When the Committee of Eleven was appointed on August 31, 1787,
to settle a number of open questions, election by Congress was still the
dominant proposal. A substantial majority of the Committee, however,
favored other methods of election.41 On September 4, the Committee recommended an office of Vice President and the electoral college system of
electing the President.4
The debates at the Convention reveal that the objections to a legislative election and doubts about the capability of the people to elect were
principal factors in leading to settlement on the present method. By
creating an electoral college, the delegates felt they had avoided the possibility of "cabal" and "corruption" and had created a mechanism
through which the "sense of the people" would operate in the choice of
the President. 3 Thus, the President would be selected by electors chosen
specially for that purpose from among the people rather than by a preestablished body which could be tampered with; members of Congress
and persons holding places of trust or profit under the United States
would not be eligible for the office of elector, as they might be partial to
the President in office; the electors would meet on the same day within
their respective states, which would expose them to fewer pressures than
if they were all to meet at one place; the electors would vote by ballot,
37. 2 Farrand at 32.
38. Id. at 58.
39. Id. at 101.
40. Id. at 404.
41. The Committee consisted of Abraham Baldwin of Georgia, David Btearley of Now
Jersey, Pierce Butler of South Carolina, Daniel M. Carroll of Maryland, John Dickinson of
Delaware, Nicholas Gilman of New Hampshire, Rufus King of Massachusetts, James Madison
of Virginia, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, Roger Sherman of Connecticut and Hugh
Williamson of North Carolina. During the debates Wilson, Madison, Morris, Dickinson
and Carroll, as noted, had expressed strong support for direct election. See supra note 27.
Williamson had indicated that he might support such a method, suggesting that each voter
cast three votes so that small state candidates would be in the field. 2 Farrand 113. Madison, Morris, King and Wilson also supported election by electors chosen by the people. 1
Farrand 80; 2 Farrand at 56-57, 403-04. Butler had proposed a system of electors chosen
by the state legislatures, with the votes of all states equal. Id. at 112. Sherman had supported an election by Congress. I Farrand 68; 2 Farrand 29.
42. Id. at 496-99.
43. See generally The Federalist No. 68 (P. Ford ed. 1898) (A. Hamilton).
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which would assure the secrecy of their votes; the electoral votes would

be listed, certified, sealed and transmitted to the President of the Senate
and then opened and counted before a joint session of Congress, which

would preserve the secrecy of the vote until the results were announced
before an open forum; and, in the event no one had a majority of the

votes of the electors, the House of Representatives would choose the
President "immediately" before any pressures could be brought to bear

on its members.
The evidence is compelling that the Framers envisioned a system under
which persons of the highest caliber would be chosen as electors. These

electors would meet in their various states, evaluate the merits of various
persons for President, and each vote for two persons for President. In

casting their votes, they would take into account the views of the people,
4'
but not be bound by them, as they were to exercise their own judgment.

Said Hamilton in No. 68 of The Federalist:
It was equally desirable that the immediate election should be made by men most
capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and
inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons,
selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to45 possess
the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.

Although the Framers left the manner of selecting the electors to the
44. There is a view that the Framers did not intend the electors to operate independently
of the people. L. Wilmerding, supra note 2, at 21; Roche, The Founding Fathers: A
Reform Caucus in Action, 55 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 799, 810-11 (1961). As the text indicates,
this author is of a different opinion. Thus, during the debates on September 4, 1787, Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina objected to the electoral college because "[tihe Electors will be
strangers to the several candidates and of course unable to decide on their comparative
merits." 2 Farrand 501. Abraham Baldwin of Georgia replied that "increasing intercourse
among the people of the States, would render important characters less & less unknown
." Id. This is one of the few references in the debates to the contemplated role of the
electors. See also id. at 58 and 100. The Federalist Papers contain a number of references
pointing to their independent status. An excerpt from No. 68 appears in the body of the
text. Hamilton also stated in that paper: "The choice of several, to form an intermediate
body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or
violent movements than the choice of one who was himself to be the final object of the
public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the
State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much
less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if
they were all to be convened at one time in one place." The Federalist No. 68, at 453 (P.
Ford ed. 1898) (A. Hamilton). He added that because of a number of safeguards against
corruption, the electors "will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their
transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory
prospect of their continuing so to the conclusion of it." Id. at 454.
45. Id. at 452.
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state legislatures, it appears that many of them assumed that the legislatures would provide for popular election.4" Not until the second half of
the nineteenth century, however, did this become a reality in all states.
During the first half of the century, various systems of selecting electors
were used." Election by the state legislatures themselves was employed
by many states in the first eleven elections. 48 It was not until 1832 that
every state except South Carolina had abandoned this method in favor of
popular election. South Carolina continued the practice until the 1860's,
and the method was used under special circumstances by Massachusetts
in 1848, when no electors received a majority of the popular vote, by the
newly reconstructed state of Florida in 1868, and by the newly admitted
state of Colorado in 1876.
In allotting electoral votes to the states in accordance with the total
representation of the states in Congress, the Framers gave something to
both small and large states. All states, regardless of size, received three
electoral votes, corresponding to the two Senators and one Representative
to which they would be entitled. The large states won the right to have
the element of population recognized, since the assignment of electoral
votes would also depend on the state's representation in the House of
Representatives.
However, this apportionment received scant attention in the debates
and appears not to have been the result of any significant compromise
between small and large states. Indeed, many of the Framers believed
that this provision would make the large states dominant in the electoral
voting. In order to balance this influence, the Framers provided that when
no candidate received a majority of the electoral votes, the House of
Representatives would select the President from the top five, with all
states having equal voting power. This feature of the system received
considerable attention in the debates and represented a compromise of
great significance, because a number of delegates were of the view that
many elections would be thrown into the House.49
46. See Feerick, supra note 22, at 253-54 nn.40-44.
47. These are described in C. Paullin, "Political Parties and Opinions, 1788-1930," in
Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States 88-89 (1932). See Hearings on
Nomination and Election of President and Vice President and Qualifications for Voting Before
The Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of The Senate Comm. on The Judiciary,
87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 446 (1961) (hereinafter cited as 1961 Senate Hearings]. See
also N. Peirce, supra note 2, at 309-11, 74-78; L. Wilmerding, supra note 2, at 42-67.
48. In the period between 1812 and 1820, nine state legislatures chose the electors for
their state. Six did so in 1824 and two in 1828. C. Paullin, supra note 47.
49. The Committee of Eleven actually suggested that the contingent election of President be assigned to the Senate. However, during the debates on September 4, 5 and 6 con-

siderable opposition developed to this recommendation. Alarm was expressed that, in view
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The design of the Framers in creating the electoral college never really
was carried out. In the first two elections, George Washington was everyone's choice for President, receiving the votes of all the electors. There
was no need for the electors to deliberate. By 1800, political parties,
which had not been contemplated by the Framers, were part of the American scene. This development brought an end to the independent elector
and gave rise to the pledged elector, a member of a publicly-announced
party slate of electors under instructions to vote for his party's candidates.
This unexpected change in the role of the presidential elector led a Senate
Select Committee to state in 1826:
In the first election held under the constitution, the people looked beyond these
agents, fixed upon their own candidates for President and Vice President, and took
pledges from the electoral candidates to obey their will. In every subsequent election,
the same thing has been done. Electors, therefore, have not answered the design of
their institution. They are not the independent body and superior characters which
they were intended to be. They are not left to the exercise of their own judgment; on
the contrary, they give their vote, or bind themselves to give it, according to the will
of their constituents. They have degenerated into mere agents, in a case which
requires no agency, and where the agent must be useless, if he is faithful, and dangerous, if he is not. 50

One commentator later said:
This usurpation of the electors' functions, though peaceably achieved, amounted to a
coup d'itat. It was an amendment of the written Constitution by the unwritten Constitution. The electors, while retaining their legal status of independence, became henceforth hardly more than men in livery taking orders from their parties.51

III.

DEFECTS AND DANGERS OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

While the country has been fortunate in the caliber of its Presidents,
it has not been fortunate in the actual operation of the electoral college.
Experience has demonstrated that the electoral college is filled with defects and dangers which pose a serious threat to the stability of our
presidential system. The nature and history of these defects and dangers
are discussed here.
A.

The Popular-Vote Winer Can Lose
What is necessary to win the Presidency is a majority of electoral,
not popular, votes. Such a majority is attainable without having a plurality of the total popular vote.Y In fact, it is possible for a candidate to
of its roles in the appointive, treaty-making and impeachment processes, the Senate would
become too powerful if it also had this function. Thus, on September 6, on motion of Roger
Sherman of Connecticut, the House of Representatives was substituted for the Senate by
a vote of 10 to 1. 2 Farrand 527.
50.

S. Doc. No. 22, 19th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1826).

51. A. Schlesinger, Paths to the Present 114 (1949).
52. Since presidential elections are decided on the basis of electoral votes, there is no
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win a majority of the electoral votes with considerably less than onefourth of the total popular votes. If a candidate were to win a plurality of
the popular votes in eleven large states plus one other state, he would
have a majority of the electoral votes, even if he received no popular
votes in the remaining thirty-eight states.' This is an extreme example
but it serves to underscore the disproportion between the electoral and
popular votes. This disproportion is attributable to a number of factors.
First, the disproportion is due in part to the fact that each state is entitled to at least three electoral votes regardless of its population." As a
result, the ratio of electoral votes to population varies from state to state.
It is one to 75,389 in Alaska; one to 260,452 in Arizona; one to 330,579
in Virginia; and one to 392,930 in California." While it might seem that
the apportionment of electoral votes favors residents of small states, the
converse is more likely the case, since large state voters potentially affect
a greater number of electoral votes. A voter in Alaska, Delaware, Nevada,
Vermont, or Wyoming can only influence three electoral votes, while a
voter in New York can influence forty-three electoral votes.ae Indeed,
the electoral votes of New York alone constitute more than fifteen percent of the number necessary for election. And, the combined electoral
votes of New York and California equal the combined electoral votes of
twenty other states.
established national machinery for even certifying the number of popular votes received by
various candidates. The popular vote is usually computed, however, by adding together the
number of votes cast for each slate of electors in each state. In states which permit separate
voting for electors or split ticket voting, each elector on a slate may have a different vote.
The traditional practice is to award the candidates the number of popular votes received by
the highest-polling elector pledged to him in the state. The sources for all popular vote
figures used in this article are, for the elections of 1824 through 1916, S. Petersen, A Statistical History of the American Presidential Elections (1963), and, for the elections of 1920
through 1964, R. Scammon, America at the Polls (1965). While discrepancies will be found
among various sources reporting the popular vote, these sources are considered the most
authoritative. N. Peirce, supra note 2, at 302.
53. At present, a majority is 270 votes. The electoral votes of New York (43), California
(40), Pennsylvania (29), Illinois (26), Ohio (26), Texas (25), Michigan (21), New Jersey
(17), Florida (14), Massachusetts (14), and Indiana (13), the eleven largest states, total 268.
The population of these states constitutes 56.78 percent of the national population (based on
the 1960 census).
54. If the number of congressional seats were based exclusively on population, each
congressman would represent about 400,000 people. By virtue of their small populations,
Alaska, Nevada, Vermont and Wyoming would be entitled to no congressman. U.S. Const.
art. I, § 2, however, guarantees them at least one Representative.
55. See App. A.
56. This aspect of the system is the subject of an excellent article, Banzhaf, Reflections
on the Electoral College, One Man, 3.312 Votes. A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral
College, 13 Vill. L. Rev. 303 (1968).
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Second, the assignment of electoral votes to the states does not reflect
population changes occurring between decennial censuses. The number
of Representatives to which a state is entitled is determined after each
census, and the official assignment does not become effective until two
years later. Thus, a presidential election which falls in the same year as
a census is governed by the apportionment based on the census of a decade before. This operates to the disadvantage of voters in rapidly growing states.
A third reason for the disproportion is that a state's electoral votes
remain fixed regardless of whether one person or one million persons vote
in the state. For example, in the 1964 election three times as many people
voted in Delaware as in Alaska; yet each state cast three electoral
votes. More people voted in New Jersey than in Texas; yet Texas had
twenty-five electoral votes while New Jersey had only seventeen. In
Alaska, 67,259 voters influenced the assignment of three electoral votes,
at a ratio of one electoral vote for every 22,419 voters. In New York the
ratio was one electoral vote for every 166,657 voters. In the 1960 election
about as many people voted in Mississippi as in South Dakota; yet
Mississippi cast twice as many electoral votes as South Dakota.
Fourth, under the electoral college system, as presently constituted, the
winner of the highest number of popular votes cast in a state receives all
of that state's electoral votes. This is the "winner-take-all, loser-takenothing" feature of the system. It cancels out at an intermediate stage all
popular votes cast in a state for candidates other than the plurality
winner. The plurality winner receives 100 percent of a state's electoral
vote while the other candidates receive zero. In the election of 1960, for
example, 3,224,099 Democratic popular votes in California failed to yield
any electoral votes. In 1944, Thomas E. Dewey received approximately
three million votes in ten states from which he obtained sixty-two electoral votes. He received 2,987,647 popular votes in New York alone but
no electoral votes. In 1924, John W. Davis received 136 electoral votes in
the states where he obtained about two million popular votes. He received
no electoral votes for approximately another six million popular votes.
As Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, a leading advocate of
electoral reform in the first half of the nineteenth century, stated: "To
lose their votes, is the fate of all minorities, and it is their duty to submit;
but this is not a case of votes lost, but of votes taken away, added to those
of the majority, and given to a person to whom the minority is opposed." '
The "minority" referred to by Senator Benton may in fact be a majority
of the state's voters because the combined popular votes received by the
57. 41 Annals of Cong. 170 (1824).
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losing candidates could exceed those cast for the winner. In the election
of 1912, for example, the winning percentage of the popular vote was less
than forty percent in twenty states, and less than thirty-five percent in
three of those states. 58
The "winner-take-all" feature not only fails to give any recognition to
minority (sometimes, majority) votes cast in a state, but it also prevents
voters of similar persuasions in different states from pooling their popular
votes on a national basis. In 1964, for instance, President Johnson received 948,540 votes in Florida while Barry Goldwater obtained 905,941.
Therefore, Johnson won Florida's fourteen electoral votes. In Misssissippi
Johnson received 52,618 popular votes and Goldwater 356,528. Consequently, Mississippi gave its seven electoral votes to Goldwater. Although Goldwater won a substantial majority of the popular votes on a
two-state basis, he received only one-third of their combined electoral
votes. In 1960, President Kennedy obtained 2,377,846 votes in Illinois
while Richard M. Nixon received 2,368,988. Kennedy, therefore, was
awarded Illinois' twenty-seven electoral votes. On the other hand, in
Indiana Nixon received 1,175,120 popular votes and Kennedy 952,358.
Hence, Indiana gave its thirteen electoral votes to Nixon. On a two-state
basis, Nixon received a majority of the popular votes but less than onethird of their combined electoral votes.
This disproportion between electoral and popular votes can be found in
every election. Appendix B shows the percentages of the popular and
electoral votes received by major party candidates from 1824 to 1964. As
these reflect, fourteen persons were elected President with less than a
majority of the popular vote. Three of the fourteen were the popularvote losers. John Quincy Adams, with fewer popular and electoral votes
than Andrew Jackson, was chosen President by the House of Representatives in the election of 1824.11 In the election of 1876, Samuel J. Tilden
lost the Presidency by one electoral vote, although he had over 250,000
popular votes more than Rutherford B. Hayes. In 1888, Benjamin Harrison defeated Grover Cleveland, who had 100,000 more popular votes.00
58. In fifteen other states the winning percentage was between forty and fifty percent.
Examples of other elections in which the winner of a state's electoral votes received less
than a majority of its popular votes are 1892 (nineteen states), 1908 (nine states), 1924
(thirteen states), and 1948 (thirteen states).
59. It should be noted that in the election of 1824, the legislatures of Delaware, Georgia,
New York, Louisiana, South Carolina and Vermont selected the electors for their states, so
that the national popular vote figures are not complete.
60. While Kennedy is generally credited with having received about 112,000 more popular
votes than Nixon in 1960, there is a view that Nixon was the popular-vote winner. 'The
correctness of this view is tied up with the counting of the popular votes cast in Alabama.
The traditional practice of reporting the popular vote as the vote received by the elector
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In a number of other elections, a small shift in the total popular vote
could have resulted in a major shift in the electoral vote and reversed the
outcome. This is because a shift in the popular vote in a few key states
would have changed the disposition of all of their electoral votes. Thus, in
1884, a shift of 575 popular votes in New York would have resulted in
the election of James G. Blaine, and in 1916, a shift of 1,983 popular
votes in California would have elected Charles Evans Hughes, while
President Wilson would have been the popular-vote winner by a margin
of approximately 580,000 votes. In 1948, a shift of a total of 29,294
votes in Illinois, California and Ohio would have resulted in Thomas E.
Dewey's election, with President Truman having over 2,000,000 more
popular votes. Other elections in which a minor shift would have changed
the outcome appear in Appendix C.
In his treatise on the electoral college system, Neal R. Peirce states:
"Careful analysis shows that the danger of an electoral college misfire [of
the popular-vote winner losing] is not just historical but immediate in
any close contest."6 1 He adds:
With spirited two-party competition in every region of the country, there is every
possibility that the nation may experience a string of close elections like those of
the 1870s and 1880s. And if history and mathematics can be our guide, the country
will run a high chance of electoral disaster in every such election. 62
candidate polling the largest state-wide vote on each of the competing elector tickets has
developed against the background of elector tickets pledged to vote for the candidates of
their parties. In 1960 the Democratic slate of electors in Alabama consisted of eleven electors
who were nominated in a state primary. Six of the eleven were unpledged, and eventually
voted in the electoral college for Senator Harry F. Byrd. Five were pledged, and eventually
voted for Kennedy. The highest unpledged elector received 324,050 popular votes while the
highest pledged elector received 318,303. Kennedy's nationwide plurality of about 112,00 indudes the 318,303 figure. It is said that is unfair because most, if not all, of the same voters
also voted for unpledged electors. If the 324,050 and 318,303 figures are both counted, then the
Alabama Democratic votes are, in effect, counted twice. Congressional Quarterly has suggested dividing the 324,050 votes into eleven parts and awarding five-sixths (147,295) of
them to Kennedy. When this is done, Nixon has approximately 58,000 more popular votes
nationwide than Kennedy. 19 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 286 (1961). It is noteworthy that this
proportional vote formula was used by the Democratic National Committee in determining
Alabama's votes at the 1964 Democratic National Convention. The Official Manual for the
Democratic National Convention of 1964, at 17-18 (prepared by Clarence Cannon, 1964).
61. N. Peirce, supra note 2, at 141. In his book, Peirce sets forth an analysis of electoral
voting patterns done by Charles W. Bischoff of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
In any election as close as 1960, says Mr. Peirce, there is a fifty-to-fifty chance that the
popular-vote winner will lose in the electoral college. According to the analysis, there is
one chance in three that the popular-vote winner will lose if his lead is one half million
votes; one in four, where the lead is between a half million and a million and a half; and
one in eight, where the lead is two million. Id. at 141-42.
62. Id. at 145.
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B. The House Could Elect the President and the Senate
the Vice President
As earlier noted, if no candidate receives a majority of the electoral
votes for President, the House of Representatives selects the President
with each state, regardless of population, having one vote and with the
votes of a majority of all the states necessary for election. In an election
by the House, the five smallest states, with one Representative each and
a combined population of less than two million, would have the same
voting power as the five largest states, with a total of 154 Representatives
and a combined population of 64 million. Alaska, with one Representative
and a population of 226,167, would have the same influence as New York,
with forty-one Representatives and a population of 16,782,304. The
twenty-six smallest states, with seventy-six Representatives (out of a
total of 435) and a total population of about thirty-one million (out of a
national total of about 180 million),3 would be able to elect the President.
Fifty-nine of the seventy-six Representatives would have it within their
power to cast the votes of these states.
If an election were thrown into the House, it could result, as history
demonstrates, in members casting their votes against the candidate who
carried their districts or states.64 If voting in the House followed party
lines, and if the party of the popular-vote loser had control of the necessary number of state delegations, he would win the election.
An election in Congress would likely involve wheeling and dealing"6
and, because of the "one state, one vote" method of voting in the House
of Representatives, the election of a President could depend on the votes
of states supporting a third party candidate. Another possibility is that
the House might be unable to reach any decision by Inauguration Day, in
which event the Vice President would act as President until the House
selected the President and he qualified. Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that the Senate and House could select a split ticket-the President
from one party and the Vice President from another. This is possible
because the political composition of the two bodies might be different and
because the methods of voting, the requirements for election and the
numbers of candidates considered are not the same. 0
63. Population figures used in this article are based on the 1960 census. The District of
Columbia, whose population is larger than that of eleven states, has no voice in a contingent election, since it has no representation in Congress.
64. See notes 69-70, infra.
65. It is interesting to note that following the House election in 1825, an attempt was
made to eliminate the possibility of the House ever again having to decide the election
of the President. Indeed, the House itself passed a resolution to this effect in 1826 by a vote
of 138 to 52. 2 Cong. Deb. 2004 (1826).
66. The dual voting feature of the original Constitution resulted in a split ticket In the
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On four occasions in American history Congress has been intimately in-

volved in the election of the President or Vice President. In the election
of 1800 the Democratic-Republican electors voted for Thomas Jefferson
and Aaron Burr, intending Jefferson for President and Burr for Vice
President. Since there was no separate ballot for Vice President under
the original method of election, Burr received as many electoral votes as
Jefferson. The House, consequently, was required to choose between them
for President, electing Jefferson on the thirty-sixth ballotY' The defect
in the Constitution which caused this tie was eliminated by the Twelfth
Amendment's requirement of separate ballots for President and Vice
President in the electoral college.
The House of Representatives had to choose the President again in the
election of 1824.68 Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams and William H.
Crawford, as the recipients of the highest three numbers of electoral

votes, were the candidates considered by the House. Adams was selected
on the first ballot, receiving the votes of thirteen of the twenty-four states.
Seven states gave their votes to Jackson and four to Crawford. A change
of only one vote in any of six of the thirteen states voting for Adams
would have prevented his election.69
In the election of 1836 Martin Van Buren won a majority of the electoral votes. His running mate, Richard Mentor Johnson, failed to receive
the votes of the Virginia electors, and therefore ended up receiving only
one half of the electoral votes for Vice President. Since he did not have a
election of 1796 and a tie in the election of 1800. If it had not been changed by the Twelfth
Amendment, this feature could have resulted in other split tickets or, possibly, intended
vice presidential candidates receiving more electoral votes than their presidential running
mates. This is because under the original method, party A had to be careful that its electors
did not cast all their votes for their intended vice presidential candidate. Otherwise, he
might be tied for President with the intended presidential candidate of the party. Thus,
some electors of party A had to throw away their "second place" votes. If too few were
thrown away, party B's electors might vote for party A's vice presidential candidate and
make him President. If too many, party B might be able to elect its presidential candidate
as Vice President. See L. Wilmerding, supra note 2, at 34-41.
67. On each of the first thirty-five ballots, taken over a one week period, Jefferson
received the votes of eight states, Burr of two states and two states were evenly divided.
Due to the influence of Alexander Hamilton, who could not see Burr as President, the
Federalist member in the congressional delegation of one of the two states which had been
evenly divided, absented himself for the thirty-sixth ballot, and the Federalist members
of the other state cast blank votes. As a result, only Democratic-Republicans were left to
cast the votes of these two states (Maryland and Vermont), and they voted for Jefferson.
See generally, E. Roseboom, A History of Presidential Elections 39-47 (1965).
68. See id. at 84-88.
69. Three of the thirteen states had cast all their electoral votes for another presidential
candidate (Henry Clay) ; three had cast a majority of their votes for Jackson; and one had
divided its electoral votes among the four presidential candidates. S. Petersen, supra note
52, at 18.
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majority, the Senate was required to choose between Johnson and vice
presidential candidate Francis Granger. Johnson was elected by a vote of
thirty-three to sixteen."0
In the election of 1876 a question arose over the awarding of the electoral votes of four states, each of which had sent double sets of elector
returns to the President of the Senate. 7 A Republican-controlled Senate
and a Democratic-controlled House disagreed on which returns to accept.
An electoral commission consisting of eight Republicans and seven Democrats was formed to resolve the controversy. By a strict party vote of
eight to seven, all of the disputed electoral votes were awarded to President Hayes. Hayes' margin of victory was one electoral vote, and a shift
of only 116 popular votes in one of the four states would have given
Samuel J. Tilden, instead of Hayes, an electoral majority of 185 to 184.12
A shift of a few popular votes in the elections of 1836, 1856, and 1860
would have thrown those elections into Congress.7" In 1948 shifts of
12,487 votes in California and Ohio, or 20,361 votes in Illinois and Ohio,
or 25,740 votes in California and Illinois would have sent the election to
Congress, where no party had control of the necessary twenty-five state
delegations in the House of Representatives.74 In 1960 a shift of 4,480
votes in Illinois and 4,491 in Missouri would have resulted in no candidate winning a majority of the electoral votes.70
Due to the candidacy of George C. Wallace, the 1968 election could be
the first since 1824 to be decided in the House of Representatives." It is
70. Three Democratic Senators voted for Johnson notwithstanding that their states had
cast their electoral votes for Granger. One Senator, whose state had given its electoral votes
to Johnson, voted for Granger.
71. See E. Roseboom, supra note 67, at 243-49.
72. S. Petersen, supra note 52, at 45-47.
73. In 1836, the required shift was 2,183 votes in Pennsylvania; in 1856, 17,427 votes in
Indiana, Illinois and Delaware; and in 1860, 18,050 votes in California, Illinois, Indiana, and
Oregon, or 25,069 votes in New York. If the election had gone into the House in 1860, an
impasse might have resulted since no party had control of the necessary eighteen state
delegations. See id. at 22, 33, 35; N. Peirce, supra note 2, at 318-19.
74. The Democrats controlled twenty-one state delegations, the Republicans twenty, the
Dixiecrats four, and three were evenly divided. The Dixiecrats, whose candidate, Senator
Strom Thurmond, had received thirty-nine electoral votes, would have held the balance of
power. In the Senate, the Democrats controlled fifty-four seats and the Republicans fortytwo. Barkley's chances of being selected Vice President would have been good.
75. Kennedy received 303 electoral votes and Nixon 219. A majority at that time was
269 votes.
76. The political alignment of the House will depend on the November 1968 elections,
since all 435 seats are up for election. In the Senate, where the election of the Vice President
would be decided, the Democrats currently control sixt,-three seats and the Republicans
thirty-seven. Thirty-four Senate seats are up for election. Twenty-three of these belong to
Democrats and eleven to Republicans.
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reported that he could win the forty-seven electoral votes of Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina.77 Moreover, his
presence on the ballot in other states could split the states in such a way
as to prevent the major candidates from obtaining a majority (i.e., 270
votes). In such a case Wallace could be in a position to decide the election
in the electoral college itself, by instructing his electors to vote for one
of the major candidates, or in Congress, if he had the support of several
state delegations.
In an attempt to meet the possibility of the 1968 election being thrown
into Congress, Representatives Charles E. Goodell and Morris K. Udall
suggested, but without success, that both major parties write into their
platforms planks pledging their members of Congress to vote for the
candidate who had received the highest popular vote., 8 Under their plan
the major candidates would have pledged not to make any deals with
Wallace, each candidate for the House would have pledged, if elected, to
vote for the plurality winner for President, and each candidate for the
Senate, if elected, and each Senator would have pledged to vote for the
plurality winner for Vice President. The extent to which such a makeshift
arrangement could bind Congress in advance and keep it bound would
largely depend on the willingness of its members to honor their pledges.
The parties could not bind Congress, and the electors themselves would
not be covered by the plan.
C. Electors Could Frustratethe Will of the People
Nowhere in the Constitution is there any specific requirement binding
electors to vote for the candidates of their parties. Because of the design
of the Framers that electors be free agents, the predominant view is that
they are under no legally enforceable obligation to do so.-, The fact that
77. N.Y. Times, July 30, 1968, at 27, col. 2.
78. See N. Y. Times, July 27, 1968, at 26, cols. 1-2; July 25, 1968, at 22, cols. 2-4; July
18, 1968, at 23, col. 1.
79. Several state decisions have held that electors cannot be compelled to vote a particular way. See Opinion of the Justices, No. 87, 250 Ala. 399, 34 So. 2d 598 (1948); Breidenthal
v. Edwards, 57 Kan. 332, 339, 46 P. 469, 471 (1896); State ex rel. Beck v. Hummel, 150 Ohio
St. 127, 146, 80 N.E.2d 899, 909 (1948). Contra, Thomas v. Cohen, 146 Misc. 836, 84142,
262 N.Y.S. 320, 326 (Sup. Ct. 1933). The Supreme Court has never squarely passed on
the question. However, in Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952), the Court held that a party
could exact a pledge to support its nominees as a condition to certification as a candidate
for elector in a party primary.
Support for the freedom of electors to vote for whom they please can also be found in
the fact that when electors defected in the past, their votes were counted by Congress. In
Kirby, Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures over Presidential Elections, 27
Law & Contemp. Prob. 495, 509 (1962), it is stated: "If an elector chooses to incur party and
community wrath by violating his trust and voting for some one other than his party's can-
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electors almost always vote for their party's candidates might seem to
indicate that no real danger exists in this area. 0 However events in
several recent elections have emphasized that there is genuine peril in
having intermediate electors.
In 1960, Henry D. Irwin of Oklahoma was chosen as one of eight
Republican electors in his state. When Oklahoma's electoral college met
on December 19, 1960, Irwin voted for Senator Harry F. Byrd, who was
not even a candidate for President. Relying upon his so-called constitutional freedom to vote for whom he pleased, Irwin stated: "I was
prompted to act as I did for fear for the future of our republic form of
government. I feared for the immediate future of our Government under
the control of socialist-labor leadership .... I executed my constitutional
right and . . . duty."18 Irwin also said that he wanted to insure
("areturn to respect for the Constitution by the election of a conservative
coalition government."" 2 Four years earlier, in the election of 1956, the
Democratic Party was the victim of the defection of an elector. W. F.
Turner was selected as a Democratic elector in Alabama when Stevenson
and Kefauver obtained 56.5 percent of the popular vote in that state. At
the meeting of the Alabama electoral college, Turner broke his party oath
and voted for one Walter B. Jones, a circuit court judge of Alabama,
stating: "I have fulfilled my obligations to the people of Alabama. I am
talking about the white people." 3 In the election of 1948 Preston Parks
ran as an elector on both the Democratic and States' Rights tickets in
Tennessee. The Democrats carried the state, but at the meeting of Tennessee's electoral college in December, Parks voted for the States' Rights
candidates, who had received only 13.4 percent of the popular vote cast
in the state. While Parks had announced he would vote that way prior to
didate, it is doubtful if there is any practical remedy. Once he is appointed, he is to vote.
Legal proceedings which extended beyond the date when the electors must meet and vote
would be of no avail. If mandamus were issued and he disobeyed the order, no one could
change his vote or cast it differently. If he were enjoined from voting for anyone else, he
could still abstain and deprive the candidate of his electoral vote."
80. It has been calculated that of the 15,245 electoral votes cast between 1820 and 1964,
at most twelve were cast contrary to "instructions." N. Peirce, supra note 2, at 124. In 1876,
when one electoral vote was the margin of victory, Republican elector James Russell Lowell
refused, despite urging to do so, to vote for Tilden, stating: "In my own judgment I have
no choice and am bound in honor to vote for Hayes, as the people who chose me expected me
to do. They did not choose me because they have confidence in my judgment but because
they thought they knew what the judgment would be. If I told them that I should vote for
Tilden, they would never have nominated me. It is a plain question of trust." Letter from
Lowell to Leslie Stephen, quoted in id. at 124.
81. 1961 Senate Hearings at 446.
82. Id. at 596.
83. N.Y. Times, December 18, 1956, at 34, col. 6.
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the November election, the Democratic voters of Tennessee nevertheless
had no opportunity to cast a vote for a full slate of Democratic electors
who intended to vote for their party's nominees.
A problem related to that of the unfaithful pledged elector is that of
the unpledged elector. Unpledged electors disappeared from the American
scene around 1800 only to reappear in 1960 in a few states permitting the
nomination of such electors. In the June 1960 Democratic primary in
Alabama, six unpledged and five pledged electors were nominated as the
Democratic electors. This combination slate was chosen in November;
and, at Alabama's electoral college, the unpledged electors voted for
Senator Harry Byrd for President. The Democratic voters of Alabama
had no way of voting for a slate of eleven electors pledged to Kennedy.
Unlike Alabama, the voters of Mississippi and Louisiana in 1960 had
a choice between Democratic pledged and unpledged slates of electors.
The unpledged electors won in Mississippi while the pledged electors won
in Louisiana. The eight unpledged Mississippi electors voted for Byrd.
Although the Louisiana electors voted for Kennedy, an unsuccessful attempt was made in that state, before the electoral college met, to suspend
the state's electoral laws and appoint independent electors. 4
Following the voting in November 1960, Republican elector Irwin
joined an Alabama attorney, Mr. R. Lea Harris, in a movement designed
to elect some third candidate in the electoral college."6 The plan was to
get Republican electors, who otherwise would cast useless votes for
Nixon, to join with defecting Southern Democratic electors and the
fourteen unpledged electors in favor of some third party candidate. Although the plan did not succeed, it calls attention to the freedom of
electors and demonstrates that defecting electors and unpledged electors
could hold the balance of power in the electoral college in a close election.86
In the 1964 election the unpledged elector once again appeared. In the
Alabama Democratic primary, a full slate of unpledged electors was nominated. As a result, the Democratic voters of that state had no opportunity
to register a vote for Johnson and Humphrey. Since the Republican Party
carried the state, its slate of pledged electors voted for Goldwater for
President.
The use of intermediate electors can also at times lead to confusion
84. See 1961 Senate Hearings at 415; N. Peirce, supra note 2 at 106.
85. The plan is described in 1961 Senate Hearings at 596-656, and N. Peirce, supra note 2,
at 106-08. See also "The Electoral College," Memorandum prepared by the staff of the Senate
Subcommn. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 9-10 (1961).
86. For the closeness of elections generally, see App. C.
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among the voters or cause a state to lose some or all of its electoral
votes." In the election of 1948 only the names of the Democratic and
Republican presidential candidates appeared on the ballot in Ohio. On the
other hand, only the names of the electors of the Progressive Party appeared. This arrangement confused thousands of voters who voted for
some Progressive electors as well as for either Truman or Dewey. These
votes had to be invalidated. In 1856 a blizzard prevented the electors of
Wisconsin from voting on the statutory day, and Congress was unable to
decide whether or not those votes should be counted. In the election of
1880 the electors of Georgia voted on the wrong day, with the result that
their votes were not counted. In the elections of 1820 and 1832 the votes
of certain states were rejected on technical grounds. While most of these
situations are not likely to recur, other situations arising from the use of
electors can occur in any election.
D. State Legislatures Could Also Frustratethe Will of the People
Under the Constitution, the state legislatures have the power to determine the manner by which the electors are to be selected. While today the
electors are popularly elected in every state on election day on a general
ticket or at large basis, it is not inconceivable that in the future some
legislatures might use this power for partisan purposes.
Indeed, this power was so used by the Michigan legislature in 1892.
The legislature was controlled by Democrats who feared that the Republican ticket would carry the state and receive all of its electoral votes in the
presidential election. In order to prevent this from happening, the legislature changed the state's method of awarding electoral votes from the
general ticket to a district system, under which each of the state's twelve
congressional districts became a separate electoral district, and two at
large districts, one Eastern and one Western, were established. The new
law provided that the winner of the most popular votes in each district
received one electoral vote. The Legislature's action, which split the
state's electoral votes in the election, was sustained by the Supreme Court
in McPherson v. Blacker."" The Court held that "the appointment and
mode of appointment of electors belong exclusively to the States under the
Constitution of the United States." 8 In dictum, the Court stated that
"[t]here is no color for the contention that under the [fourteenth and
fifteenth] amendments every male inhabitant of the State being a citizen
of the United States has from the time of his majority a right to vote for
87. See generally, "The Electoral College," supra note 85, at 15-16.
88. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). In the 1892 election, Michigan awarded five electoral votes to
Grover Cleveland and nine to Benjamin Harrison.
89. Id. at 35.
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presidential electors."9 0 "[F]rom the formation of the government until
now," the Court said, "the practical construction of the clause has conceded plenary power to the state legislatures in the matter of the appointment of electors." 91
Because of the long history of popular election, it is doubtful that any
state today would prevent its citizens from voting in a presidential election. But the power of the states over such elections can be used in ways
that effectively deprive voters of the opportunity to cast meaningful votes.
Thus, in 1948 the voters of Alabama had no opportunity to vote for
Truman and Barkley because the Democratic party in that state supported Senator Strom Thurmond.9 - In 1960 the voters of the same state
could not cast a vote for a full slate of electors pledged to Kennedy and
Johnson; and in 1964 the same voters could not vote for any electors
pledged to Johnson and Humphrey.
E. The Death of a Candidate Could Lead to Uncertainty
While the passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has greatly strengthened our system of presidential succession, there are still certain gaps
which have not been closed. These arise because of the electoral college.
If a candidate were to die (or withdraw) after the November voting and
before the electors met in December, there would be uncertainty as to his
successor. Although the national committees of both major parties have
been authorized by their parties to fill vacancies occurring before or after
elections, a committee's choice might not be accepted by the electors
pledged to the deceased candidate. 3 Some might feel released of any
90. Id. at 39.
91. Id. at 35.
92. This was also true in 1912, when Theodore Roosevelt, the Progressive Party candidate, ran on the Republican line in California. The voters had no way of expressing a
choice for the national candidates of the Republican Party, William Howard Taft and
James S. Sherman, without writing in the names of electors pledged to them. In 1860 the
voters in ten states had no opportunity to vote for an elector slate pledged to Lincoln.
93. See J. Feerick, From Failing Hands; The Story of Presidential Succession 324-25
(1965), where the procedures are set forth. In 1860 the Democratic National Committee
filled the vacancy which occurred when Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick of Alabama declined
the vice presidential nomination after the convention had adjourned. Herschel V. Johnson, a
former governor of Georgia, was chosen in his place. In 1872 Democratic presidential candidate Horace Greeley died shortly after the November election. No one was appointed to
fill the vacancy. When the electors met, Greeley's sixty-six electoral votes were distributed
among four persons. His vice presidential running mate received only eighteen of the votes.
Three were cast for Greeley himself, but they were not counted because Greeley was not
alive when they were cast. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 1285-1305 (1873). In 1912 Vice
President James S. Sherman, who was running for re-election, died a few days before the
election. It was not until after the November voting that the Republican National Committee
appointed Nicholas Murray Butler, then President of Columbia University, to receive
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obligation to vote for the new nominee, since they were elected to vote for
the deceased candidate and his running mate, and no others.
The death of a candidate between the meeting of the electoral college
and the counting of the electoral votes on January 6, when the candidates
with a majority of the electoral votes are declared President elect and
Vice President elect, would result in uncertainty as to whether his electoral votes could be counted. If they were not and if the deceased candidate were the presidential contender with a majority of the electoral
votes, the election of President would devolve on the House while there
would be a Vice President elect. In the author's opinion, the electoral
votes of a deceased candidate should be counted because the counting
is a nondiscretionary act and because the Twelfth Amendment appears to
require only that the person be alive when the votes are cast. The subject,
however, is not free from doubt.
If a President elect and Vice President elect were declared on January 6
and one of them died before January 20, the provisions of the Twentieth
and Twenty-Fifth Amendments would be applicable. If the President
elect died, the Vice President elect would become President on January 20
by virtue of the Twentieth Amendment, and he would be empowered
under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to nominate a person for Vice
President, who would take office when confirmed by a majority of both
Houses of Congress. If the Vice President elect died, the President elect,
upon taking office, would be able to nominate a person for Vice President
under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
In the event no candidate received a majority of the electoral votes on
January 6 and one of the candidates to be considered by Congress in the
contingent election died, Congress would be empowered under the Twentieth Amendment to provide for the case. However, Congress has never
passed any implementing legislation to cover this contingency.
F. Other Defects
While it may not be capable of precise measurement, the "winner-takeall" feature of the system undoubtedly overemphasizes the political importance of the heavily populated states. Since elections are usually won
by capturing their electoral votes, it has not been surprising that most
presidential candidates have come from those states.04 Seventeen of the
fifty-two nominations for President of the two major parties from 1868
through 1968 have gone to New Yorkers. Of the total of 104 nominations
Sherman's eight electoral votes. The eight electors honored the committee's choice and
voted for Butler.
94. Some of the statistics used in this section are taken from the excellent brief filed by
the State of Delaware in Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966).
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for President and Vice President, residents of New York have been
nominated twenty-five times. Six large states account for sixty-nine of the
total of 104 nominations. During this period twenty-four states have
failed to have citizens nominated for either President or Vice President.
As for electing a President, thirty-six states, including eight of the
original thirteen, have never had one of their citizens elected to the Presidency. New York, Ohio, Massachusetts and Virginia have had twenty-one
elected for a total of thirty terms. It is interesting to note that from 1792
through 1964, New York supported the winning candidate in thirty-eight
of the forty-four elections. In five of the six where New York did not, it
cast its electoral votes for either a current or former New York governor.
Not only does the "winner-take-all" feature favor large states, but it
gives excessive power to organized groups in such states, since they may
be able to swing the entire electoral vote of the state from one candidate
to the other and, with it, possibly the election. This feature also can be
viewed as placing a premium on the effects of fraud, accident and other
factors, since a change of a few popular votes could influence the disposition of all of a state's electoral votes.0
Another feature of the system came to light this year because some of
the possible presidential and vice presidential combinations in each party
involved residents of the same state. "IThis called attention to the restriction contained in the Twelfth Amendment that: "The Electors shall meet
in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state
with themselves .

..."

This provision of the Twelfth Amendment was carried over from Article II. The original provision, however, was part of a scheme where the
electors cast two votes for President. The Framers felt that such a provision was needed because of the anticipated problem of the electors being
partial to, and voting for, inhabitants of their own states for President,
which would favor large state candidates. The Framers believed that if
the electors were required to cast one of their two votes for President for
an inhabitant of another state, persons of national reputation rather than
local favorites would be elected President. With the passage of the
Twelfth Amendment, requiring separate votes for President and Vice
95. See generally, "The Electoral College," supra note 85, at 36. One interesting case
in point appears to have occurred in the election of 1916, where a shift of 1,983 popular
votes in California would have swung the election to Charles Evans Hughes. Hughes allegedly
lost the electoral votes of California by failing to meet with Governor Hiram Johnson while
campaigning in that state. It seems that Hughes made every effort to see Johnson and at
one point both were in the same hotel at the same time. See E. Roseboom, supra note 67,
at 385-86; see App. C.
96. See N.Y. Times, July 22, 1968, at 30, col. 1.
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President, and the development of political parties, the reasons for the
original provision largely disappeared. Little attention appears to have
been given the
provision in the debates preceding the adoption of the
7
AmendmentY
As the provision now stands, the political parties are not prohibited
from nominating a ticket of citizens of the same state. The provision,
which simply prohibits the electors of the state from voting for both candidates, would become important where those candidates won the most
popular votes in their state and the electoral votes of the state were
necessary for election. The electors of the state could only vote for one of
them, while the electors of other states would not be subject to the same
restriction.
In an attempt to circumvent this provision, a number of suggestions
have been advanced. One that has received some notoriety is that one of
the candidates could move to and become an "inhabitant" of another
state before the electoral college met. 8 Whether this would be effective is
debatable. It can be argued that leaving one's state either shortly before
or after the November voting would violate the spirit of the provision.
The only effective solution is to eliminate the prohibition altogether, as it
clearly has no present day merit.
IV.

CHANGING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

A. Legislative Developments, 1797-1962
On January 6, 1797, Representative William L. Smith of South Carolina
introduced in Congress the first proposal for reform of our system of
electing the President.99 Since then, more than 500 such proposals have
been offered in Congress. 10 0 Apart from the changes effected by the
Twelfth Amendment, the constitutional provisions for electing the President and Vice President have withstood all attempts at reform. '1 1
In 1813, 1819 and 1820 the Senate passed district vote plans for
choosing the President, but none could muster the necessary two-thirds
97.

See generally, 14 Annals of Cong. 21, 89, 95, 161 (1803-04).

98. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1968, at 24, col. 1; July 22, 1968, at 30, col. 1; see New

York

Post, August 7, 1968, at 7, cols. 1-4 (quoting interview with Professor Paul Freund of Harvard Law School).
99. Tienken, Proposals to Reform our Electoral System, Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service 20 (1966).
100. N. Peirce, supra note 2, at 151.
101. The Amendment provides for separate votes for President and Vice President by
the electors; requires a majority vote for election to either office; and limits the House's
choice to the "persons having the highest numbers [of electoral votes] not exceeding
three," and the Senate's to the persons with the "two highest numbers," See note 17, supra.
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vote in the House of Representatives. 0 2 The 1813 plan would have divided each state into separate districts for the selection of electors, with
each state having as many districts as it had Senators and Representatives. The proposals which passed in 1819 and 1820 provided for the
selection of two electors at large and the rest on a district basis.
In 1823 Senator Thomas Hart Benton proposed a district system based
on the direct vote of the people for the President and Vice President."0 3
His proposal contemplated the elimination of electors and the division of
each state into as many districts as the number of its members of Congress. Although Benton's plan was unable to obtain sufficient votes in
either House of Congress, his views were echoed by Presidents Andrew
Jackson and Andrew Johnson in special messages to Congress in the
1830's and 1860's.104
In 1875 committees of both Houses, following the lead of Senator
Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, recommended a district system of election
similar to Benton's proposal, except that the number of districts was
limited to the number of Representatives to which a state was entitled
and the popular-vote winner in the state received two electoral votes.'
Congress, however, failed to act. In 1878 and 1880 a proportional vote
proposal was endorsed by a select committee of the House, but no vote
was taken in Congress.'0 6 This plan, like the district proposals before it,
would have retained the formula for allocating electoral votes among the
states. It differed in that it would have divided each state's electoral vote
in proportion to the division of the popular vote in the state.
102. The proposals are discussed in Ames, "The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States During the First Century of Its History," Annual Report of the
American Historical Association for 1896, 81-84 (1897) (the pertinent excerpts are reprinted
in 1961 Senate Hearings at 812-13). The evidence is compelling that many of the Framers

contemplated electors being chosen in districts. Madison said that this method "was mostly,
if not exclusively in view when the Constitution was framed and adopted .... " Letter
from James Madison to George Hay, August 23, 1823, in 3 Farrand 458-59. Jefferson,
Hamilton, Madison, Jackson, Van Buren, John Quincy Adams and Daniel Webster were
early supporters of such a method. Wilmerding, supra note 2, at 58. Iadison said
that the district system "was exchanged for the general ticket & the legislative election,
as the only expedient for baffling the policy of the particular States which had set the
example." 3 Farrand 459. Jefferson said: "All agree that an election by districts would be
best, if it could be general; but while ten States choose either by their legislatures or by a
general ticket, it is folly and worse than folly for the other six not to do it." 10 The Writings
of Thomas Jefferson 134 (Library ed., 1903). Forms of the district plan were used on fiftytwo occasions during the period between 1789 and 1892. Maryland used it in all elections prior
to 1836, except the first two. See Paullin, supra note 47, at 89.
103.

Ames, supra note 102 at 89. (1961 Senate Hearings 812).

104. Id. at 90-91 (1961 Senate Hearings 812-13).
105. Id. at 92-93 (1961 Senate Hearings 813-14).
106.

Id. at 97-98 (1961 Senate Hearings 817).
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In 1891 President Benjamin Harrison urged the adoption of an automatic vote system which would have written into the Constitution the
"winner-take-all" system of casting electoral votes. 0 7 Congress again
refused to act and interest in the subject faded. In the 1920's and 1930's
Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska and Representative Clarence F.
Lea of California introduced proportional plans in Congress, but none
came to a vote on the floor, although committees of the House approved
Lea's proposal in 1933 and 1934. In 1934 the Senate narrowly failed to
pass an automatic vote proposal of Senator Norris, under which the office
of presidential elector would have been abolished and the "winner-takeall" system frozen into the Constitution. 08
Following World War II, a concerted attempt was made in Congress to
push through some thoroughgoing reform. In this period Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and Representative Ed Gossett of Texas
became the leading advocates of the proportional vote plan, and Senator
Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota and Representative Frederic R. Coudert,
Jr. of New York of the district vote plan. Their proposals were similar to
some of the proportional and district vote plans of the nineteenth century.
The Lodge-Gossett plan, as it came to be called, provided for the retention of the formula for assigning electoral votes on the basis of Senators
and Representatives, the division of the electoral votes of each state in
proportion to the popular vote cast in the state, the elimination of the
office of elector, and a plurality of the electoral vote for election as President and Vice President. 0 9 The Mundt-Coudert plan also contemplated
retaining the method of apportioning electoral votes, but it would have
retained the office of elector, divided each state into electoral districts
equal in number to the number of its Representatives in Congress,
awarded two electoral votes to the statewide popular-vote winner, and in
the event no one received a majority of the electoral votes, referred the
contingent election to a joint session of Congress with each member
having one vote." 0
107.
108.
against,
109.

9 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, 208-10 (1910).
78 Cong. Rec. 9127 (1934). The vote was forty-two in favor and twenty-four
or seven short of a two-thirds vote.
See S.3. Res. 2, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); HJ. Res. 2, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.

(1949). The proposal counted votes to the nearest thousand. When it came up for discussion
in the Senate, it was amended so as to require a plurality of at least forty percent for election as President and Vice President, with the contingent election being referred to a joint
session of Congress, in which each member would have one vote. 96 Cong. Rec. 1275
(1950). It should be noted that Senator Lodge personally favored a popular vote system,
but he felt it had no chance of passage. 96 Cong. Rec. 882 (1950). See 28 Cong. Digest
199 (1949).
110. See H.J. Res. 192, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); H.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong., 1st Seas.
(1953) ; S.J. Res. 95, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
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In 1950 the Lodge-Gossett plan was vigorously debated in Congress."'
Its proponents argued that it would more accurately reflect the popular
strength of the candidates than the present system; would encourage
political activities in every state, and would eliminate defects in the system arising out of the "winner-take-all" feature, the use of presidential
electors and the formula for electing a President in the House of Representatives. Its opponents urged that it would endanger our two-party
structure by making it possible for splinter groups to obtain electoral
votes; would weaken our federal system, since states no longer would
have a voice as to the method of selecting electors; and would give inordinate influence to one-party states and states with low voter turnout
inasmuch as their electoral votes would not be effectively split, as it was
assumed would be the case in large states.
On February 1, 1950, the Senate passed the Lodge-Gossett proposal by
a vote of 64 to 27.11- However, it failed to pass the House."' In 1951 it
was endorsed by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, but no
action was taken on the floor of Congress. In 1955 it was reported out by
the Senate Judiciary Committee and in March of the following year
Senator Price Daniel of Texas, a strong advocate of the proportional plan,
moved to substitute for the Committee's proposal a proposal which would
1
give each state a choice between the district and proportional plans."
By coupling the support for one with the support for the other, he hoped
to get the necessary two-thirds vote for passage.
In the ensuing debate, opponents of the proposal, led by Senators Paul
H. Douglas of Illinois and John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts, argued
that a change to a proportional or district vote system would greatly
enhance the power of conservatives in both parties."' They reasoned that
the large states, where two party competition was keen, would likely
split their electoral votes between the parties, whereas the conservative
southern states would continue to cast most, if not all, of their votes for
Democratic candidates, thereby increasing the influence of that wing of
the party. Since the importance of large states and their urban centers,
where liberal Republicans would have their strength, would be decreased,
the influence of conservative rural interests of the Republican Party
would be increased. Kennedy forcefully argued in favor of the present
system, stating that the nation's big cities and the minority groups within
111. See 96 Cong. Rec. 877-86, 1064-85, 1148-63, 1259-79 (1950).
112. Id.at 1278.
113. Id. at 10427-28. On a motion to suspend the rules for its consideration, 210 Representatives voted against and 134 in favor.
114. The substitute was to S.J. Res. 31, 84th Cong.) 1st Sess. (1955).
115. See 102 Cong. Rec. 5150, 5248-54, 5539-64 (1956).
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them were greatly underrepresented in the state legislatures and in Congress. The electoral college, said Kennedy, compensated for these inequities by giving urban centers and their minority groups an influential
role in presidential elections. Said Kennedy: "[I] t is not only the unit vote
for the Presidency we are talking about, but a whole solar system of
governmental power. If it is proposed to change the balance of power of
one of the elements of the solar system, it is necessary to consider all the
others.""' 6 Addressing himself to the nature of the substitute proposal,
Kennedy declared:
The two schemes joined together by this shotgun wedding . . .are wholly incompatible, the sponsors of each having thoroughly and accurately assailed the merits of
the other over the years. The Mundt proposal multiplies the general ticket system;
the Daniel proposal [his proportional vote proposal] abolishes it. The Mundt proposal continues the importance of States as units for electoral purposes; the Daniel
proposal reduced it.... And yet it is now proposed that the Senate, being unable to give
its approval to either system, should lump them together and give each State its choice.
No surer method of introducing17confusion and loss of public confidence in our electoral system could be devised."
On March 27, 1956, the Daniel proposal passed, by a vote of 48 to 37,

as a substitute for the proportional vote plan recommended by the Senate
Judiciary Committee in 1955.11' Since the vote was short of two-thirds,
Daniel and others decided not to submit the measure for a final vote and
the proposal was recommitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee. No
proposed amendment has reached the floor of either House of Congress
since then. While the proportional and district plans were receiving careful attention in 1950 and 1956, direct election proposals received scant
attention and were soundly defeated in the Senate." 9 In 1961 extensive
hearings were held by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the following year the Subcommittee reported a district plan to the full committee, where it died.
B. Recent Developments, 1963-1968
During the past few years renewed interest has been focused on the
subject of electoral reform. A number of reasons for this can be cited.
116. Id. at 5150.
117. Id. at 5159.
118. Id. at 5673.
119. In 1950, William Langer of North Dakota recommended 'a direct vote, coupled

with national nominating primaries. It was rejected by a margin of 60 to 31. 96 Cong. Rec.
1276 (1950). Senator Hubert Humphrey's substitute amendment providing only for direct
election was defeated by a vote of 63 to 28. Id. at 1276-77. Senator Langer's proposal was
rejected in 1956 by a vote of 69 to 13. 102 Cong. Rec. 5637 (1956). Senator Herbert Lehman
of New York then offered an amendment providing only for direct election, which was defeated by a vote of 66 to 17. Id. at 5657.

19681

THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

In 1962, 1963 and 1964 the Supreme Court rendered its historic decisions in the field of legislative reapportionment, which removed numerous
inequities from the political scene and firmly established the principle of
"one person, one vote.' 20 In a message to Congress on January 28, 1965,
President Johnson urged reform of the electoral college so as to "assure
the orderly continuity in the Presidency that is imperative to the success
and stability of our system."'' The President stated: "Today there lurks
in the electoral college system the ever-present possibility that electors
may substitute their own will for the will of the people. I believe that
possibility should be foreclosed."' 22 The President said that the general
ticket system of awarding electoral votes should be retained as it was "an
essential counterpart of our Federal system.... . Accompanying the
President's message was a draft of a proposed constitutional amendment
which would retain the electoral votes of each state, abolish the office of
elector, provide for the automatic casting of electoral votes for the plurality winner in the state, and refer the contingent election to the Senate
and House meeting jointly. Thereupon, proposals incorporating the President's recommendations were introduced in Congress by Senator Birch
Bayh of Indiana and Representative Emanuel Celler of New York.12'
However, no action was taken in Congress with respect to these or other
proposals.
120. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court broke into the thicket
of legislative apportionment, holding that the federal courts had jurisdiction over the apportionment of the state legislatures. Less than one year later, in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.

368 (1963), the Court held that Georgia's county unit vote system violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating: "Once the geographical unit for which
a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have
an equal vote.... The concept of 'we the people' under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifications." Id. at
379-80. In 1964, in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, the Court found that a Georgia
congressional districting statute violated Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, which
"means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to
be worth as much as another's." Id. at 7-8. Four months later, in Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964), the Court held that the equal protection clause "requires that the seats in
both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis."
Id. at 568. Finally, in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.. 474 (1968), the Court held that
"the Constitution permits no substantial variation from equal population in drawing districts for units of local government having general governmental powers over the entire
geographic area served by the body." Id. at 484-85.
121. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1 Lyndon B. Johnson 103
,1965).
122. Id. at 102-03.
123. Id.
124. S.J. Res. 58, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.J. Res. 278, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965). See also H. J. Res. 469, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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On January 20, 1966, the President renewed his recommendation for
electoral reform. 12 5 On July 20, 1966, the State of Delaware moved in the
United States Supreme Court for leave to file a complaint against the
other forty-nine states and the District of Columbia. Delaware asked the
Court to issue an injunction against continued use of the "winner take
all" formula, arguing that it was unconstitutional. Following the bringing
of this suit, twelve other states, both large and small, moved to be joined
as plaintiffs. New York opposed the motion and on October 17, 1966, the
Supreme Court, without opinion, declined to hear the complaint. 2 ' Suits
seeking similar relief were subsequently commenced by interested citizens
suffered or are
in Mississippi, Virginia and California. They have 2 either
7
likely to suffer the same fate as the Delaware suit.

In 1966 and 1967 the Chamber of Commerce of the United States
announced that it favored abolishing the present system in favor of a
district system or direct nationwide popular vote, 22 and Gallup polls
showed that a substantial majority of the people favored its elimination
125. 112 Cong. Rec. 703-04 (1966).
126. Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895, rehearing denied 385 U.S. 964 (1966). The
states which moved to be joined as plaintiffs were Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. See Cong. Q. Weekly Rep., Aug. 19, 1966, at 1811-15.
127. In Penton v. Humphrey, 264 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Miss. 1967), a citizen's suit to
enjoin the appointment of electors by any method not designed to reflect the will of the
people as evidenced by its popular vote was dismissed. In so deciding, the court relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966), and the
Supreme Court's recognition in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. at 380, that the inequities
of the electoral college are an exception to the one person, one vote doctrine. On March 21,
1968, a group of citizens representing each of Virginia's congressional districts commenced an
action to have the state's presidential electors elected from districts and to bar in Virginia
the continued use of the winner take all system of selecting electors. On July 16, 1968, a
specially-convened three-judge court dismissed plaintiffs complaint, holding that the winner
take all system was permissible under the Constitution, that no specific method of appointing
electors can be forced upon the state legislatures, and that any successful modification of the
electoral college must be done on a nationwide basis and by way of a constitutional amendment. Williams v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 37 U.S.L.W. 2065 (E.D. Va. July 7, 1968);
see N.Y. Times, March 22, 1968, at 38, col. 3. On May 6, 1968, a suit was filed in California
by four residents of that state against the United States and the governor and secretary of
state of California, seeking to declare void and unconstitutional and to enjoin the election of
the President and Vice President by electors selected pursuant to the winner take all system.
On July 29, 1968, the United States was dismissed as a party defendant, California's motion
to dismiss the complaint was denied, and the convening of a three-judge panel was ordered.
The court is not expected to decide the question before it (i.e., whether or not the general
ticket system is constitutional) until early 1969. Letter to the author from James R. Hagan
(a lawyer and one of the plaintiffs), dated August 22, 1968. See N.Y. Times, May 7, 1968,
at 27, col. 5.
128. N. Peirce, supra note 2, at 189.
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and the substitution of a popular-vote system. -9 A poll of the nation's
state legislators revealed that about ninety percent of those who responded
favored reform.' Of these, 58.8 percent supported direct election.
Also in 1966 Senator Birch Bayh withdrew his support for the automatic vote system recommended by the President, and introduced a proposed constitutional amendment providing for direct election.1 3 ' On January 7, 1967, a commission of the American Bar Association, composed of
governors of both parties, judges, practicing lawyers, law professors,
political scientists, and representatives of labor and management, released
the results of a year-long study of the system. 3 2 It suggested the complete
abolition of the electoral college in favor of direct election. The recommendations of the Commission subsequently were adopted by the American Bar Association and embodied in proposals introduced in Congress."
129. Id. at 360-61.
130. The poll was taken by Senator Quentin N. Burdick of North Dakota. He received
responses from about 2,500 of the country's approximately 8,000 state legislators. Cong. Q.
Weekly Rep., Dec. 16, 1966, at 3030; see N. Peirce, supra note 2, at 192-93.
131. SJ. Res. 163, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The proposal was also co-sponsored by
Senators Alan Bible of Nevada, Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, Joseph S. Clark, Jr. of
Pennsylvania, Paul H. Douglas of Illinois, Warren G. Magnuson of Washington, Wayne
Morse of Oregon, Edmund S. Muskie of Maine and Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin. This
proposal required at least a forty percent plurality for election and provided that in the
event no candidate received such a number, Congress would select the President and Vice
President in a joint session, with each member having one vote. In 1967 Senator Bayh introduced a similar proposal, except that the contingent election was changed to a popular vote
runoff election between the top two teams. S.J. Res. 2, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). In
providing for the runoff, Senator Bayh adopted a recommendation made by the American
Bar Association Commission on Electoral College Reform. See note 133, infra.
132. "Electing the President," supra note 1. The members were Robert G. Storey, its
chairman, Dean Emeritus of the Southwestern Legal Center, and a former ABA President;
Henry Bellmon, a former Republican governor of Oklahoma; Professor Paul Freund of
Harvard Law School; E. Smythe Gambrell, Georgia attorney and a former ABA President;
Ed Gossett, Texas attorney and a former Democratic member of the House of Representatives from Texas; William T. Gossett, current President of the ABA, former President of the
American Bar Foundation and former general counsel to the Ford Motor Company; William
J. Jameson, a former ABA President and a federal district court judge in Montana;
Kenneth B. Keating, an associate judge on the New York Court of Appeals and a former
United States Senator from New York; Otto E. Kerner, then Democratic Governor of
Illinois and now a federal court of appeals judge; James C. Kirby, Jr., a professor of law
and former chief counsel to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments; James M. Nabrit, Jr., former President of Howard University and former Deputy
United States Representative to the United Nations; Herman Phleger, California attorney
and former legal advisor to the United States Department of State; C. Herman Pritchett,
former President of the American Political Science Association; Walter P. Reuther, President
of the United Automobile Workers Union; and Whitney North Seymour, New York attorney
and former President of the ABA. Id. at vii-viii.
133. The Commission recommended that an amendment to the Constitution be adopted
so as to:
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In 1966 and 1967 the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of
the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted extensive hearings on the
subject, at which witnesses testified in favor of the four basic plans for
reform.' Although its hearings have concluded, the Subcommittee has
not yet reported out a proposal, and no hearings have been scheduled by
1. provide for the election of the President and Vice-President by direct, nationwide
popular vote;
2. require a candidate to obtain at least forty percent of the popular vote in order to
be elected President or Vice-President;
3. provide for a national runoff election between the two top candidates in the event no
candidate receives at least forty percent of the popular vote;
4. require the President and Vice-President to be voted for jointly;
5. empower Congress to determine the days on which the original election and the
runoff election are to be held, which days shall be uniform throughout the United
States;
6. provide that the places and manner of holding the presidential election and the
inclusion of the names of candidates on the ballot shall be prescribed in each state
by the legislature thereof, with the proviso that Congress may at any time by law
make or alter such regulations;
7. require that the voters for President and Vice-President in each state shall have the
qualifications requisite for persons voting therein for Members of Congress, with the
proviso that each state may adopt a less restrictive residence requirement for voting
for President and Vice-President provided that Congress may adopt uniform age
and residence requirements; and
8. contain appropriate provisions in case of the death of a candidate. "Electing the
President," supra note 1, at 3.
See the following direct election proposals: S. J. Res. 2 (Senator Birch Bayh and eighteen
co-sponsors), S. amend. No. 163 to S.J. Res. 2 (Senator Everett M. Dirksen), 6 (Senator
Margaret Chase Smith), 15 (Senator Quentin N. Burdick), 90th Cong., 1st Ses. (1967);
S.J. Res. 179 (Senator Mike Mansfield), 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) ; H.J. Res. 470 (Representative Emanuel Celler), 447 (Representative Charles E. Bennett), 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967). S.J. Res. 6 requires a majority vote for election, while the others provide for a
plurality of at least forty percent of the popular vote.
134. Hearings Relating to the Election of the President, Before Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.; 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1968). 85 persons testified or submitted statements. Support for the proportional
plan was expressed, among others, by Senators Holland, Smathers, Sparkman and Ervin.
See 113 Cong. Rec. 6587-88 (daily ed. May 9, 1967), 6824 (daily ed. May 15, 1967); S.J.
Res. 3 (Senator George Smathers), 7 (Senator Spessard Holland), 84 (Senator John Sparkman and two co-sponsors), 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Senators Karl E. Mundt, Hugh
Scott and Thruston B. Morton spoke in favor of the district proposal. See 113 Cong. Rec.
1586-87 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1967); S.J. Res. 12 (Senator Karl Mundt and ten co-sponsors),
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ; see also S.J. Res. 25 (Senator Hugh Scott), 55 (Senator Norris
Cotton), 86 (Senator Ernest Gruening), 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Senator Robert Kennedy and then Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach indicated their support for the
automatic vote plan; while Senators Birch Bayh, Everett Dirksen, Stephen Young, Margaret
Chase Smith and others urged a change to direct election. See 113 Cong. Rec. 1551-52
(daily ed. Feb. 6, 1967).
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the House of Representatives. In August, 1968, the Republican and
Democratic Conventions adopted platform planks calling for electoral reform."35
' Whether the Ninety-First Congress will accept the opportunity
presented to improve our electoral system remains to be seen.
C. The Basic Plans
When Congress does deal with the problem of electoral reform, the
main proposals before it will undoubtedly be the proportional, district,
automatic and direct vote plans. Of these plans, the author believes that
direct, nationwide popular vote is superior in all basic respects to the rest.
All the electoral vote plans are subject to serious objections. Since they
would retain the formula for distributing electoral votes among the states,
they would not eliminate the inequities arising out of the use of that
formula. Each state would continue to cast its assigned electoral votes
regardless of vote turnout or population changes occurring between decennial censuses; and the ratio of electoral votes to population would
vary from state to state. Consequently, the proportional, district and
automatic vote proposals all leave open the possibility of the popular vote
loser being elected President.' Since each provides for an election by
Congress when no candidate receives the required number of electoral
votes, an area for widespread wheeling and dealing remains, in which the
plurality winner in the nation could lose. 3 7
135. Neither Convention endorsed a specific proposal. The Republicans proposed "to
reform the Electoral College system, establish a nation-wide, uniform voting period for
Presidential elections, and recommend that the states remove unreasonable requirements,
residence and otherwise, for voting in Presidential elections." N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 196S, at
25, col. 8. The Democratic plank provided: "We urge reform of the electoral college and
election procedures to assure that the votes of the people are fully reflected."
136. In his article, John F. Banzhaf, Ill, shows by way of mathematical analysis that: (i)
under a winner take all system, citizens of thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have
less than average voting power (i.e., ability to affect the election by his vote), while citizens of
such states as New York and California have two and one-half times the voting power of citizens of some of the smaller states; (ii) under a proportional vote system, citizens of thirty-six
states and the District of Columbia would have less than average voting power, while citizens
of such states as Alaska and Nevada would have more than four times the voting power of
citizens of states like New York and California; and (iii) under a district vote system,
citizens of thirty-four states would have less than average voting power. Only under direct
election, he concludes, would all citizens have "equal voting power and an equal chance to
affect the outcome of the election." Banzhaf, supra note 56, at 325.
137. None of the major plans suggest a contingent election other than in Congress. An
automatic vote proposal introduced in the House by Representative Jonathan Bingham,
however, does provide for a runoff election. H.J. Res. 1086, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
A proposal by Representative Edward Hutchinson of Michigan would simply change
the contingent election provision so as to provide for a joint vote of both Houses, with each
member having one vote. H.J. Res. 1112, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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The automatic vote proposal is particularly objectionable because it
would freeze the "winner-take-all" system into the Constitution, thus perpetuating one of the most criticized features of the electoral college.
While it might appear not to be the case, the "winner-take-all" system
could effectively continue in a number of states under a district vote
system. This would be true in the five states which have only one Representative, in the District of Columbia, in one-party states, in states where
party strengths are uniform throughout, and in the voting in each state
for the two electors corresponding to its two Senators. 1 8 Even in states
where the electoral votes would be split, the votes of the minority in each
district would be suppressed at an intermediate stage. Indeed, it would be
possible for the popular vote loser in a state to obtain a majority of its
electoral votes. This could happen where a candidate won a majority of
districts by narrow margins and lost a minority of districts by large
margins. The district vote proposal is subject to the further objections
that it could lead to the gerrymandering of districts for partisan advantage and that it would favor small states by reducing the importance of
large states. As one authority observed:
The basic conservative bias of the district system could be expected to reassert
itself in election after election because the balance of the existing general ticket
system-the inflated electoral vote power of conservatives in small states versus the
swing power of liberal groups in the large states-would be erased. Conservatives,
moreover, would frequently win more of the districts in large states than their percentage of the statewide vote would justify, because the popular vote majorities in
conservative suburban and rural districts generally tend to be less than the liberal
would be a continuing danger of minority
majorities in center-city districts.... There
Presidents in close Presidential elections.'13
While the proportional vote plan would more accurately reflect the
popular vote cast in each state than the district and automatic vote plans,
it would favor citizens of the smaller states and introduce new inequities.
This is because larger states would lose the advantage they possess by
reason of the "winner-take-all" or unit vote rule feature of the present
system, while small states would retain the voting advantage they have by
reason of the unequal distribution of electoral votes, which gives such
states greater electoral votes per resident. Another defect in the propor138. In the fifty-two instances that district vote plans were used between 1789 and 1892
(see supra note 102), all of a state's electoral votes were cast as a unit thirty-six times. In
1960, if the then existing congressional districts were employed as electoral districts, twentyone states would have cast their votes as a bloc; seven would have cast all but one as a
bloc; and in six states, the minority party would have won under twenty-five percent of
the votes. The electoral votes of most large states, on the other hand, would have been
effectively split. Under such a district system in 1960, Nixon would have won a substantial
majority of the electoral votes. "The Electoral College," supra note 85, at 21.
139. N. Peirce, supra note 2, at 163.
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tional plan is that it could seriously weaken the two party system by
encouraging third parties to enter candidates in an effort to split the
electoral vote and throw the election into Congress. The ability of splinter
groups to do so would be substantially increased, since each state's
electoral votes would be divided among all the candidates in proportion
to their statewide popular vote. 40
When examined, the objections which have been addressed to direct
election do not present a very good case against such a change in our
system. Perhaps the most serious objection which has been levelled is that
direct election would lead to a proliferation of parties and thereby weaken
our two-party system. Extensive research by political scientists has
pointed to numerous reasons for our two-party system.' 4 ' A renowned
political scientist stated that:
[S]everal factors conspired toward the development of the American dual party pattern. These included the accidents of history that produced dual divisions on great
issues at critical points in our history, the consequences of our institutional forms,
the clustering of popular opinions around a point of central consensus rather than
their bipolarization, and perhaps others. 1 '

Another said:
The bounty of the American economy, the fluidity of American society, the remarkable unity of principle of the American people, and, most important, the success of
the American experiment have all militated against the emergence of large dissenting
groups that would seek satisfaction of their special needs through the formation of
political parties. Third-party politics is generally radical politics, and surely we need
not rehearse once again the obvious fact that the appeals of radicalism have gone
unheeded in America .... 143

Others have concluded that our state party structure and the selection
of representatives by plurality vote from single member districts have
strongly contributed to the two-party system. 44 The Presidency itself is
regarded as a principal factor because it,
unlike a multiparty cabinet, cannot be parceled out among minuscule parties. The
circumstances stimulate coalition within the electorate before the election rather
than within the parliament after the popular vote. Since no more than two parties
can for long compete effectively for the Presidency, two contending groups tend to
develop, each built on its constituent units in each of the So states. 145
140. See N. Peirce, supra note 2, at 358-59.

141. The material in this section is derived from the work papers of the American Bar
Association Commission on Electoral College Reform.
142. V. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups 210 (Sth ed., 1964).
143. C. Rossiter, Parties and Politics in America 8 (1962).
144. See W. Goodman, The Two Party System in the United States 30-32 (1956);
E. Schattschneider, Party Government 69-84 (1942). See also V. Key, Jr., supra note 142, at
208-09; A. Sindler, Political Parties in the United States 50-56 (1966).
145. V. Key, Jr., supra note 142, at 209.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

The abolition of the electoral college would not change these and other
contributing factors. If anything, direct election could strengthen the
two-party system, since a third party would no longer have the ability to
influence the outcome of an election, as at present, with a small number
of electoral and popular votes. Furthermore, a direct election system can
be coupled with institutional safeguards which would operate to support
the system. 4 6
It has been suggested that direct election would destroy our federal
system and wipe out state lines. 1 At the base of this argument is the contention that the allotment of two electoral votes to each state, corresponding to its two Senators, represented a great compromise reached
between small and large states at the Constitutional Convention and,
therefore, the abolition of the electoral college would vitiate a compact
which made the Constitution possible. As earlier noted, the historical
facts are to the contrary; and, as Senator Mike Mansfield put it:
[T]he Federal system is not strengthened through an antiquated device which has
not worked as it was intended to work when it was included in the Constitution and
which, if anything, has become a divisive force in the Federal system by pitting
groups of States against groups of States. As I see the Federal system in contemporary practice, the House of Representatives is the key to the protection of district
interests as district interests, just as the Senate is the key to the protection of State
interests as State interests. These instrumentalities, and particularly the Senate, are the
principal constitutional safeguards of the Federal system, but the Presidency has
evolved, out of necessity, into the principal political office, as the courts have become
the principal legal bulwark beyond districts, beyond States, for safeguarding the
interests of all the people in all the States. And since such is the case, in my opinion,
1 8
the Presidency should be subject to the direct and equal control of all the people. '

Furthermore, it has also been suggested that direct election would
weaken the position of minority groups and cause many of their grievances to go unheeded. 4 This argument is based on the view that the
present system gives them greater voting strength than their numbers
would justify and forces the political parties to be responsive to their
needs, since they may be able to influence the disposition of all the electoral votes of their state. This reasoning runs contrary to the fundamental
principle of representative government in the United States today,
146.

See pages 40-41, infra.

See 113 Cong. Rec. 1586-87 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1967), 113 Cong. Rec. 6586-88 (daily
ed. May 9, 1967). See Spering, How to Make the Electoral College Constitutionally Repre147.

sentative, 54 A.BA.J. 763 (1968).
148. 107 Cong. Rec. 350 (1961).

149. This view is articulated by Professor Albert J. Rosenthal of Columbia Law School.
See Rosenthal, "The Last Graduation of the Electoral College," to be published in The New
Leader in the fall of 1968; Rosenthal, "The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elections," to be published in the Michigan Law Review in the fall of 1968.

1968]

THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

namely, "one person, one vote," without regard to race, sex, economic
state, or place of residence. "The notion that one group can be granted
greater voting strength than another is hostile to our standards for popular representative government." 5 0
Theory aside, it is questionable whether minority groups would be any
less effective under a system of direct election. Since presidential elections would be decided on the basis of popular votes, neither of the
parties could afford to alienate any large groups of voters. In addition,
under direct election, groups in one state could unite with groups in other
states and the votes of all would be counted at the national level. This
factor could well increase the voting strength of groups whose members
were distributed throughout the United States.
One objection that used to be urged was that despite its defects and
dangers, the electoral college should be retained because it is the only
institution weighted in favor of the interests of large states and their
urban centers.151 It was further argued that representation in Congress
and the state legislatures was weighted, due largely to malapportionment
and gerrymandering, in favor of the interests of small states and their
rural areas. Thus, the electoral college was part of a "solar system" in
which the interests of all were represented. However this was before the
"one person, one vote" decisions of the Supreme Court which have substantially changed the "solar system" of the 1950's and early 1960's and
have brought new standards of political equality to the field of legislative
reapportionment. The corresponding rationale for the electoral college has
now largely disappeared as a result of these decisions.
On the positive side, direct election is the only method that can assure
that the candidate with the largest number of popular votes will be elected
President. It is the only method that would eliminate once and for all the
principal defects of our system: the "winner-take-all" feature and its cancellation of votes; the inequities arising from the formula for allocating
electoral votes among the states; the anachronistic and dangerous office
of presidential elector; and the archaic method by which contingent
elections are handled. There would no longer be "sure states" or "pivotal
states" or "swing voters" because votes would not be cast in accordance
with a unit rule and because campaign efforts would be directed at people
regardless of residence. Factors such as fraud and accident could not
decide the disposition of all of a state's votes. Direct election would bring
to presidential elections the principle which is used and has worked well in
elections for Senators, Representatives, governors, state legislators, may150. MacDougall v. Green, 335 US. 281, 290 (1948).
151. This argument was effectively articulated during the 1956 Senate debates by Senators
Paul H. Douglas, John F. Kennedy, and others. See 102 Cong. Rec., supra note 115.
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ors, and thousands of other officials at all levels of government. That

principle, "one person, one vote," would make the votes cast by all
Americans in presidential elections of equal weight. All votes would be

reflected in the national tally. None would be magnified or contracted.
All citizens would have the same chance to affect the outcome of the election. Finally, under a popular vote system, presidential elections would

operate the way most people think they operate and expect them to
operate.
With respect to the implementation of such a system, the recommendations of the American Bar Association Commission on Electoral College
Reform offer a practical and workable formula." 2 The Commission, as

already noted, suggested a constitutional amendment requiring a popular
plurality of at least forty percent to be elected President and Vice President'53 and in the event no candidate received such a number, a runoff
between the top two candidates. The requirement of a plurality rather
than a majority would be consistent with the rule which prevails in every

other election, including the election of electors, and with the total popular
vote received by fourteen of our Presidents. The ABA Commission chose

a forty percent figure so as to render remote the possibility of a contingent election and to assure a reasonable mandate to the person elected
President. The Commission felt that a forty percent figure, together with

a national runoff, would operate to discourage splinter parties from trying
to decide the outcome of an election. The Commission reasoned that it
would seldom happen that neither of the major candidates would receive
a forty percent plurality, even with third party candidates in the field;
and that it would be unlikely that a minor party candidate could ever
obtain such a plurality. 154 However, even if a third party candidate ob-

tained more than twenty percent of the popular vote and succeeded in
152.

See "Electing the President," supra note 1; see supra note 133.

153. The Commission recommended that each voter cast a vote jointly applicable to both
offices so as to eliminate the possibility of a split ticket and implement the expectation of the
people that the presidential and vice presidential candidates of the same party will be elected.
This recommendation is similar to provisions which appear in the various state constitutions
requiring a joint vote for governor and lieutenant governor. E.g., Conn. Const. art. 4, § 3;
Hawaii Const. art. IV, § 2; N1M. Const. art. V, § 1; N.Y. Const. art 4, § 1.
154. Only in the elections of 1856 and 1912 did a third party candidate receive more than
twenty percent of the popular vote, and on both occasions a major party candidate received
more than forty percent of the popular vote. In the elections of 1824, 1848, 1860, and 1924
third party candidates received between ten and twenty percent of the popular vote, while
one or both (1848) major candidates had more than forty percent. In 1860, Lincoln
received 39.8 percent of the popular vote, even though his name was not on the ballot In
ten states and in the face of two third party candidates who obtained a total of 30.8 percent
of the popular vote. In the close election of 1948, J. Strom Thurmond and Henry A. Wallace
each received under three percent of the popular vote. See Appendices B and C.
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preventing the election of a President in the first election, he would not
be able to decide the election in Congress or in such an archaic device as
the electoral college. I" The people, in a runoff between the top two candidates, would decide the election. As the Commission stated:
A runoff between the highest two would seem to have the tendency to limit the
number of minor party candidates in the field in the original election because it is
improbable that a minor candidate would be one of the top two; and the influence of
such a group would be asserted more effectively, as now, before the major party
nominations and platforms are determined. 158

The Commission's recommendation that the qualifications for voting
in a presidential election be the same as those for voting for members of
Congress would make substantially uniform the voting qualifications in
both federal and state elections. This is because qualifications for voting
in congressional elections are defined by state law and are tied in with the
qualifications for voting for members of the most numerous branch of the
state legislatures.157 However, under the ABA's recommendations, a
state could prescribe less stringent residence requirements for presidential
elections, as many have already done,"' and Congress could establish
155. While elections and nominations usually are settled on the basis of plurality voting
at the state level, the runoff has been used with success in primary elections in the following
states: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia. In most of these states, the
runoff is resorted to when no candidate receives a majority of the popular votes and it is
limited to the top two vote getters in the first election. Iowa and South Dakota, however,
require a plurality of thirty-five percent. See generally, C. Ewing, Primary Elections in the
South (1953); V. Key, Jr., Southern Polities in the State and Nation 416-23 (1949). The
runoff is used in connection with presidential elections in France and in a number of Latin
American and African countries. In December 1965, France held its first presidential election
by direct election. Due to the presence of six candidates, no one received a majority of the
popular vote and a runoff between Charles De Gaulle and Francais Mitterrand was held two
weeks later. Valuable information on the workings of runoff elections in the United States
and abroad appear in the unpublished papers of the ABA Comm'n on Electoral College
Reform.
156. "Electing the President," supra note 1, at 6.
157. US. Const. art. I, § 2, and US. Const. amend. XVII require voters for members
of Congress to have the "qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch
of the State legislatures." The twenty-fourth amendment prevents a state from imposing a
poll or other tax as a voting qualification in elections for Preident or Vice President, for
presidential electors, or for Senators or Representatives. The recommendation of the ABA
Commission would likely operate to prevent a state from unreasonably reducing its voting
requirements so as to gain some special advantage in presidential elections from the number
of its voters, since the reduction would apply to elections for state legislators and Congressmen as well. It does not follow, therefore, as some have maintained, that the nationalization
of voting qualifications would be the by-product of direct election. See 113 Cong. Rec. 6587
(daily ed. May 9, 1967).
158. More than one-half of the states have relaxed their residence rules for voting in
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uniform residence and age requirements should the need ever arise for it
to do so.'

The Commission's recommendation that the state legislatures be
authorized to prescribe the places and manner of holding presidential
elections, subject to a reserve power in Congress to make or alter such
regulations, is similar to provisions now in article I governing elections
for Senators and Representatives. 0 The recommendation that Congress
be given the residual power to legislate on the question of appearances
on the ballot would, if accepted, represent an expansion of congressional
power. The ABA Commission regarded it as essential that the people
of every state have the right to vote for major party candidates. Were
a state to exclude the name of a major candidate from the ballot, Congress
would have the power to deal with such a case.''
On balance, the author believes that a system of direct, nationwide
popular vote presents the only real alternative to the existing electoral
college system.
V.

CONCLUSION

The workings of the electoral college over a period of almost two centuries have demonstrated the compelling need for substantial reform. The
electoral college is ridden with defects and dangers which could operate
to reject the popular-vote winner-the man intended by the people to be
their President. Its continuance plainly constitutes a serious threat to the
smooth functioning of our governmental system.
The philosophy behind the electoral college belongs to a bygone age.'"
The college was designed for an age when America was an agrarian society, when isolation, poverty and illiteracy were common, when transportation and communication were in their infancy, when the right to
vote was severely restricted, when political parties did not exist, when the
principle of popular vote was not firmly established and when our leaders
presidential elections. See Nomination and Election of the President of the United States,
supra note 5, at 252-59. See also The Wall Street Journal, March 20, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
159. For the residence and age requirements of the states, see The Council of State
Governments, The Book of the States, 1968-69. The voting age is eighteen in Georgia and
Kentucky, nineteen in Alaska, twenty in Hawaii, and twenty-one in forty-six states and the
District of Columbia.
160. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4.
161. See note 92 supra, and accompanying text. In order to get on the ballot,
a political party must comply with the requirements imposed by state laws. These requirements are easily met in some states, while in other states they are difficult to meet. See
generally Nomination and Election of the President and Vice President of the United States,
supra note 5.
162. The Supreme Court gave recognition to this fact in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,
376-77 n.8 (1963).
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doubted the capability of the people to choose the President. The reasons
which motivated the Framers to create the electoral college no longer
exist.
The America of today is a highly industrialized and sophisticated society
and the world's leader in free enterprise. Most of the people enjoy a good
standard of living, are literate, and are in constant contact with others
near and far. Transportation is rapid and communication almost instantaneous. The right to vote is nearly universal,'3 and political parties
present the various choices for President. And, most important, the principle of popular election has met the test of time so that today, in the
United States, it is a cherished and firmly established principle of representative government.
Not only have the reasons for the electoral college long since vanished,
but the institution has not fulfilled the design of the Framers. Today it
represents little more than an archaic and undemocratic counting device.
There is no good reason for retaining such a formula for electing the
President of the United States.
As it exists today, the nature of the Presidency demands that there be
no election barrier between the President and the people. The President
stands at the head of our government. He serves as our highest national
officer and as the symbol and spokesman for all the people. The United
States, not any particular section, state or group of voters, is his constituency. His powers and duties are national in character, and the problems and issues with which he must deal are national and worldwide in
scope. He has been aptly described as First Executive, First Legislator,
First Diplomat, Commander-in-Chief, and Leader of his Party."
Because the President plays so large a role in the affairs of our nation, it
is all the more essential that he be elected by a method which assures
fair and equal votes for all and not by a method which could operate to
frustrate the workings of democracy, undermine the office of President,
and render suspect from the outset his administration. "The conception
of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one vote.""' Surely,
the time has arrived when we should recognize this principle in the election of our nation's two highest officials.
163.
164.

See N. Peirce, supra note 2, at 205-48.
L. Heren, The New American Commonwealth 34-35 (1968).

165.

Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
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APPENDIX A

Present Distributionof Electoral Votes and Ratio of Votes to Population
(Based on 1960 Census)
State

Votes

Ratio*

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

10
3
5
6
40
6
8
3
3
14
12
4
4
26
13
9
7
9
10
4
10
14
21
10
7
12
4
5
3
4
17
4
43
13
4
26

326,674
75,389
260,452
297,712
392,930
292,325
316,904
148,764
254,652
353,682
328,593
158,193
166,798
387,736
358,654
306,369
311,230
337,573
325,702
242,316
310,069
359,984
372,533
341,386
311,163
359,984
168,692
282,266
95,093
151,730
356,870
237,756
390,286
350,473
158,112
373,325

0

Rankt
33
1
17
23
51
21
29
5
16
40
34
8
9
48
42
25
28
37
32
15
26
44
45
38
27
43
10
19
2
6
41
14
49
39
7
46
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State
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Votes

Ratio*

Rankt

8
6
29
4
8
4
11
25
4
3
12
9
7
12
3

291,036
294,781
390,323
214,872
297,824
170,129
324,281
383,187
222,657
129,960
330,579
317,024
265,774
329,315
110,022

20
22
50
12
24
11
31
47
13
4
36
30
18
35
3

* This column shows the number of persons (based on the 1960 census) per electoral
vote in each state and the District of Columbia. The national average per electoral vote is
333,314. See 1961 Senate Hearings at 670.
This column shows the rank of each state (and the District) by reason of its ratio. It
will be noted that states with few electoral votes have low ratios and high ranks.
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APPENDIX B

Percentage of Popular Vote and Electoral Vote of Presidential
Candidates, 1824-1964*

Year
1824

1828
1832

1836

1840
1844
1848

1852
1856

1860

1864

Candidates

Percentage
of Popular
Vote

Percentage
of Electoral
Vote

John Q. Adams
Andrew Jackson
William H. Crawford
Henry Clay
Andrew Jackson
John Q. Adams
Andrew Jackson
Henry Clay
William Wirt
Martin Van Buren
William H. Harrison
Hugh L. White
William H. Harrison
Martin Van Buren
James K. Polk
Henry Clay
Zachary Taylor
Lewis Cass
Martin Van Buren

31.9
42.2
13.0
13.0
56.0
44.0
54.5
37.5
8.0

32
38
16
14
68
32
77
17
2

50.9
36.6
9.7
52.9
46.8
49.6
48.1
47.3
42.5
10.1

58
25
9
80
20
62
38
56
44
0

Franklin Pierce
Winfield Scott
James Buchanan
John C. Fremont
Millard Fillmore
Abraham Lincoln
Stephen A. Douglas
John C. Breckinridge
John Bell

50.9
43.8
45.6
33.3
21.1
39.8
29.4
18.2
12.6

86
14
59
39
2
59
4
24
13

Abraham Lincoln
George B. McClellan

55.2
44.9

91
9
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Percentage
of Popular
Vote

Percentage
of Electoral
Vote
73
27
82
1850
(185 votes)
so
(184 votes)
58
42
55
45
58
42
62
33
5
61
39
65
35
71
29
66
34
82
16.5
1.5
0
52
48
76
24

Year

C2andidates

1868

Ulysses S. Grant
Horati o Seymour

1872

Ulyssess S.Grant
Horace Greeley

1876

Rutherford B. Hayes

52.7
47.3
55.6
43.8
47.9

Samuel J. Tilden

50.9

James A. Garfield
Winfield S. Hancock
Grover Cleveland
James G. Blaine
Benjamin Harrison
Grover Cleveland
Grover Cleveland
Benjamin Harrison
James B. Weaver
William McKinley
William J. Bryan
William McKinley
William J. Bryan
Theodore Roosevelt
Alton B. Parker
William H. Taft
William J. Bryan
Woodrow Wilson
Theodore Roosevelt
William H. Taft
Eugene V. Debs
Woodrow Wilson
Charles E. Hughes
Warren G. Harding
James M. Cox

48.3
48.2
48.5
48.3
47.8
48.6
46.0
43.0
8.5
51.0
46.7
51.7
45.5
56.4
37.6
51.6
43.1
41.9
27.4
23.2
6.0
49.3
46.1
60.3
34.1

1880
1884
1888
1892

1896
1900
1904
1908
1912

1916
1920

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

APPENDIX B (Continued)

Year

Candidates

Percentage
of Popular
Vote

Percentage
of Electoral
Vote

1924

Calvin Coolidge
John W. Davis
Robert M. LaFollette

54.0
28.8
16.6

72
26
2

1928

Herbert C. Hoover
Alfred E. Smith

58.2
40.8

84
16

1932

Franklin D. Roosevelt
Herbert C. Hoover

57.4
39.6

89
11

1936

Franklin D. Roosevelt
Alfred M. Landon

60.8
36.5

98
2

1940

Franklin D. Roosevelt
Wendell Willkie

54.7
44.8

85
15

1944

Franklin D. Roosevelt
Thomas E. Dewey

53.4
45.9

81
19

1948

Harry S Truman
Thomas E. Dewey
J. Strom Thurmond
Henry A. Wallace

49.6
45.1
2.4
2.4

57
36
7
0

1952

Dwight D. Eisenhower
Adlai E. Stevenson

55.1
44.4

83
17

1956

Dwight D. Eisenhower
Adlai E. Stevenson

57.4
42.0

86
14

1960

John F. Kennedy
Richard M. Nixon

49.5
49.3

62
36

1964

Lyndon B. Johnson
Barry M. Goldwater

61.1
38.5

90
10

* All electoral percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number and only the names
of candidates are listed who received more than five percent of the total popular vote cast,
except for the close election of 1948. The winning candidate in each election is listed first.
Those whose names are italicized were elected President with less than a majority of the
popular vote. See supra note 52 for the sources upon which the popular vote is based.
- Since Greeley died before the electors met (see supra note 93), the sixty-six electoral
votes which he would have received were distributed among four other persons. The chart
reflects the percentage of the electoral vote these sixty-six votes represented.
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